Corporate governance and the politics of property rights in Germany

Politics and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 195-221

  Ziegler, J Nicholas ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034385131     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329200028002003     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. J. S. Mill, Chapters on Socialism, Collected Works, vol. 5 (London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 753, quoted in Michael Freeden, Ideologies and PoliticalTheory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1996), 164.
2. J. S. Mill, Chapters on Socialism, Collected Works, vol. 5 (London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 753, quoted in Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1996), 164.
3. For the process by which the financial conception of control became ascendant, see Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990) and Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4. For the process by which the financial conception of control became ascendant, see Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990) and Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
5. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
6. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
7. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
8. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
9. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
10. For the historical emergence of Germany's constitutional treatment of the firm versus the approaches taken in other countries, see esp. Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Developments within National and International Contexts" (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1997, typescript); Sigurt Vitols et al., Corporate Governance in Large British and German Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing for Best Practice (London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 1997); and Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance in Germany: Productive and Financial Challenges (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute, 1998). For selected perspectives from the wide literature on comparative corporate governance, see Richard Buxbaum, "Comparative Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" and other essays, in Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds., Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance 52, no. 2 (1997): 737-83.
11. For representative contributions, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1994).
12. For representative contributions, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1994).
13. For representative contributions, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1994).
14. For critiques of the idea of globalization as an automatic process, see Fred L. Block, The Vampire State and Other Myths and Fallacies about the U.S. Economy (New York: The New Press, 1996); Peter B. Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 62-87; and Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
15. For critiques of the idea of globalization as an automatic process, see Fred L. Block, The Vampire State and Other Myths and Fallacies about the U.S. Economy (New York: The New Press, 1996); Peter B. Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 62-87; and Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16. For critiques of the idea of globalization as an automatic process, see Fred L. Block, The Vampire State and Other Myths and Fallacies about the U.S. Economy (New York: The New Press, 1996); Peter B. Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 62-87; and Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
17. See esp. Will Hutton, The State We're in (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); and Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Ownership for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
18. See esp. Will Hutton, The State We're in (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); and Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Ownership for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
19. A more comprehensive description would have to include a country's provisions under at least four categories: (1) the formal rules that establish the terms of liability and authority within a firm, (2) the distribution of ownership among different interest groups in a society, (3) the rights of lenders (debt holders) as opposed to owners (shareholders), (4) the informal patterns of decision making that characterize top management's links to external constituencies as well as internal stakeholders. For these issues, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, "Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States," Stanford Law Review 48, no. 1 (1995): 73-112; and Mark J. Roe, "Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States" (Symposium: Economic Competitiveness and the Law), Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 1927-2003; Roberta Romano, "A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law (response to article by Mark J. Roe," Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 2021-37.
20. A more comprehensive description would have to include a country's provisions under at least four categories: (1) the formal rules that establish the terms of liability and authority within a firm, (2) the distribution of ownership among different interest groups in a society, (3) the rights of lenders (debt holders) as opposed to owners (shareholders), (4) the informal patterns of decision making that characterize top management's links to external constituencies as well as internal stakeholders. For these issues, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, "Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States," Stanford Law Review 48, no. 1 (1995): 73-112; and Mark J. Roe, "Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States" (Symposium: Economic Competitiveness and the Law), Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 1927-2003; Roberta Romano, "A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law (response to article by Mark J. Roe," Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 2021-37.
21. A more comprehensive description would have to include a country's provisions under at least four categories: (1) the formal rules that establish the terms of liability and authority within a firm, (2) the distribution of ownership among different interest groups in a society, (3) the rights of lenders (debt holders) as opposed to owners (shareholders), (4) the informal patterns of decision making that characterize top management's links to external constituencies as well as internal stakeholders. For these issues, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, "Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States," Stanford Law Review 48, no. 1 (1995): 73-112; and Mark J. Roe, "Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States" (Symposium: Economic Competitiveness and the Law), Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 1927-2003; Roberta Romano, "A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law (response to article by Mark J. Roe," Yale Law Journal 102, no. 8 (1993): 2021-37.
22. For representative views on the evolution of the German model, see Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic and Institutional Constraints of Full-Employment Strategies: Sweden, Austria, and West Germany, 1973-1982," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis West Germany," in Goldthorpe, ed.; and Peter A. Hall, "The Political Economy of Adjustment in Germany," in WZB Jahrbuch 1997 (Berlin: Sigma, 1997).
23. For representative views on the evolution of the German model, see Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic and Institutional Constraints of Full-Employment Strategies: Sweden, Austria, and West Germany, 1973-1982," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis West Germany," in Goldthorpe, ed.; and Peter A. Hall, "The Political Economy of Adjustment in Germany," in WZB Jahrbuch 1997 (Berlin: Sigma, 1997).
24. For representative views on the evolution of the German model, see Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic and Institutional Constraints of Full-Employment Strategies: Sweden, Austria, and West Germany, 1973-1982," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis West Germany," in Goldthorpe, ed.; and Peter A. Hall, "The Political Economy of Adjustment in Germany," in WZB Jahrbuch 1997 (Berlin: Sigma, 1997).
25. For representative views on the evolution of the German model, see Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic and Institutional Constraints of Full-Employment Strategies: Sweden, Austria, and West Germany, 1973-1982," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis West Germany," in Goldthorpe, ed.; and Peter A. Hall, "The Political Economy of Adjustment in Germany," in WZB Jahrbuch 1997 (Berlin: Sigma, 1997).
26. For these developments, see esp. Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). For the historical roots of labor's commitment to the works councils in the Ruhr region, see Mary Nolan, Social Democracy and Society: Working-Class Radicalism in Düsseldorf, 1890-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
27. For these developments, see esp. Kathleen A. Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). For the historical roots of labor's commitment to the works councils in the Ruhr region, see Mary Nolan, Social Democracy and Society: Working-Class Radicalism in Düsseldorf, 1890-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
28. Alfred L. Thimm, The False Promise of Codetermination: The Changing Nature of European Workers' Participation (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1980), esp. 30-40.
29. See Hans Willy Hohn, Von der Einheitsgewerkschaft zum Betriebssyndikalismus: Soziale Schlieβung im dualen System der Interessenvertretung (Berlin: Sigma, 1988); Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Wolfgang Streeck, "Codetermination: The Fourth Decade," in B. Wilpert and A. Sorge, eds., International Perspectives on "Organizational Democracy" (New York: John Wiley, 1984), 391-422; and Thelen, Union of Parts.
30. See Hans Willy Hohn, Von der Einheitsgewerkschaft zum Betriebssyndikalismus: Soziale Schlieβung im dualen System der Interessenvertretung (Berlin: Sigma, 1988); Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Wolfgang Streeck, "Codetermination: The Fourth Decade," in B. Wilpert and A. Sorge, eds., International Perspectives on "Organizational Democracy" (New York: John Wiley, 1984), 391-422; and Thelen, Union of Parts.
31. See Hans Willy Hohn, Von der Einheitsgewerkschaft zum Betriebssyndikalismus: Soziale Schlieβung im dualen System der Interessenvertretung (Berlin: Sigma, 1988); Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Wolfgang Streeck, "Codetermination: The Fourth Decade," in B. Wilpert and A. Sorge, eds., International Perspectives on "Organizational Democracy" (New York: John Wiley, 1984), 391-422; and Thelen, Union of Parts.
32. See Hans Willy Hohn, Von der Einheitsgewerkschaft zum Betriebssyndikalismus: Soziale Schlieβung im dualen System der Interessenvertretung (Berlin: Sigma, 1988); Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Wolfgang Streeck, "Codetermination: The Fourth Decade," in B. Wilpert and A. Sorge, eds., International Perspectives on "Organizational Democracy" (New York: John Wiley, 1984), 391-422; and Thelen, Union of Parts.
33. Bericht der Kommission Mitbestimmung [Report of the Commission on Codetermination], Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung und Hans-Böckler Stiftung, 1998).
34. For examples of the banks' voting strength, with and without exercising proxy rights, see Theodor Baums and Christian Fraune, "Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft," Die Aktiengesellschaft, no. 3 (1996): 106.
35. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
36. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
37. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners.
38. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62 (December 1972): 777-95; M. C. Jensen and W. C. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305-60.
39. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62 (December 1972): 777-95; M. C. Jensen and W. C. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305-60.
40. For an example of this logic, see William Emmons and Frank A. Schmid, "Universal Banking, Control Rights, and Corporate Finance in Germany," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 80, no. 4 (1998): 19-42.
41. In 1970, corporations or joint-stock companies (Aktiengesellschaften) employed roughly 33.5 percent of German workers but comprised less than 2 percent of the 1.9 million enterprises in Germany. The others were single proprietorships (91 percent), partnerships of different types (5.8 percent), cooperatives (0.7 percent), nonstock private companies (0.2 percent), and public companies (0.2 percent). Figures from Alfred Thimm, "How Far Should German Codetermination Go?" Challenge 11 (1981). For these different organizational forms and their legal status, see Germany's Commercial Law Code, the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), articles 17-37a.
42. On centralized versus decentralized industrial orders in Germany, see Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
43. For the different types of banking institutions in Germany, see Richard Deeg, Finance Capital Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 19-21 and 83. For their role in Eastern Germany, see John R. Griffin, "Investment and Ownership in a Volatile Economy: Big Banks and the Case of the East German Economic Transition," Politics & Society 22, no. 3 (1994): 389-413. For a more general treatment of organizational experimentation and democracy, see Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism," Columbia Law Review 98, no. 2 (1998): 267-473.
44. For the different types of banking institutions in Germany, see Richard Deeg, Finance Capital Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 19-21 and 83. For their role in Eastern Germany, see John R. Griffin, "Investment and Ownership in a Volatile Economy: Big Banks and the Case of the East German Economic Transition," Politics & Society 22, no. 3 (1994): 389-413. For a more general treatment of organizational experimentation and democracy, see Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism," Columbia Law Review 98, no. 2 (1998): 267-473.
45. For the different types of banking institutions in Germany, see Richard Deeg, Finance Capital Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 19-21 and 83. For their role in Eastern Germany, see John R. Griffin, "Investment and Ownership in a Volatile Economy: Big Banks and the Case of the East German Economic Transition," Politics & Society 22, no. 3 (1994): 389-413. For a more general treatment of organizational experimentation and democracy, see Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism," Columbia Law Review 98, no. 2 (1998): 267-473.
46. See, for example, Julie A. Elston and Horst Albach, "Bank Affiliations and Firm Capital Investment in Germany," IFO-Studien 41, no. 1 (1995): 3-16; Ulrich Schroeder, "Corporate Governance in Germany: The Changing Role of the Banks," German Politics 5, no. 3 (1996): 336-370; and Emmons and Schmid, "Universal Banking."
47. See, for example, Julie A. Elston and Horst Albach, "Bank Affiliations and Firm Capital Investment in Germany," IFO-Studien 41, no. 1 (1995): 3-16; Ulrich Schroeder, "Corporate Governance in Germany: The Changing Role of the Banks," German Politics 5, no. 3 (1996): 336-370; and Emmons and Schmid, "Universal Banking."
48. See, for example, Julie A. Elston and Horst Albach, "Bank Affiliations and Firm Capital Investment in Germany," IFO-Studien 41, no. 1 (1995): 3-16; Ulrich Schroeder, "Corporate Governance in Germany: The Changing Role of the Banks," German Politics 5, no. 3 (1996): 336-370; and Emmons and Schmid, "Universal Banking."
49. For Germany's coordinating capabilities, see David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 101-34. For longer-term "coordination efficiencies" and the problems they pose for arguments from competitive selection, see Block, The Vampire State, 53-57. For two complementary views suggesting that competition may remain a dominant selection mechanism without selecting strictly on the basis of efficiency criteria, see Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 35-37; and Neil Fligstein, Ruling Markets: An Economic Sociology of Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
50. For Germany's coordinating capabilities, see David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 101-34. For longer-term "coordination efficiencies" and the problems they pose for arguments from competitive selection, see Block, The Vampire State, 53-57. For two complementary views suggesting that competition may remain a dominant selection mechanism without selecting strictly on the basis of efficiency criteria, see Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 35-37; and Neil Fligstein, Ruling Markets: An Economic Sociology of Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
51. For Germany's coordinating capabilities, see David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 101-34. For longer-term "coordination efficiencies" and the problems they pose for arguments from competitive selection, see Block, The Vampire State, 53-57. For two complementary views suggesting that competition may remain a dominant selection mechanism without selecting strictly on the basis of efficiency criteria, see Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 35-37; and Neil Fligstein, Ruling Markets: An Economic Sociology of Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
52. For Germany's coordinating capabilities, see David Soskice, "Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 101-34. For longer-term "coordination efficiencies" and the problems they pose for arguments from competitive selection, see Block, The Vampire State, 53-57. For two complementary views suggesting that competition may remain a dominant selection mechanism without selecting strictly on the basis of efficiency criteria, see Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 35-37; and Neil Fligstein, Ruling Markets: An Economic Sociology of Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
53. Karel Lanoo, "A European Perspective on Corporate Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 269-94; Martin Rhodes and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "Capitalism Unbound? The Transformation of European Corporate Governance," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 3 (1998); and Richard Deeg and Sofia Perez, "International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions: Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases" (paper presented at the 1998 American Political Science Convention, Boston, MA, 3-6 September, 1998).
54. Karel Lanoo, "A European Perspective on Corporate Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 269-94; Martin Rhodes and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "Capitalism Unbound? The Transformation of European Corporate Governance," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 3 (1998); and Richard Deeg and Sofia Perez, "International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions: Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases" (paper presented at the 1998 American Political Science Convention, Boston, MA, 3-6 September, 1998).
55. Karel Lanoo, "A European Perspective on Corporate Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999): 269-94; Martin Rhodes and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "Capitalism Unbound? The Transformation of European Corporate Governance," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 3 (1998); and Richard Deeg and Sofia Perez, "International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions: Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases" (paper presented at the 1998 American Political Science Convention, Boston, MA, 3-6 September, 1998).
56. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analaysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 63-82.
57. Ibid., esp. 69-74.
58. For examples including the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom (1992) and the Rapport Vienot in France (1995), see Le Monde, 12 July 1995, as well as James P. Hawley, "Comparative Corporate Governance: Explaining Changing Pattern in the Ownership, Control and the Governance of Large Corporations in France and Germany, with a Note on the U.K." (paper presented at the annual meetings of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle, WA, 22 March 1996).
59. For examples including the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom (1992) and the Rapport Vienot in France (1995), see Le Monde, 12 July 1995, as well as James P. Hawley, "Comparative Corporate Governance: Explaining Changing Pattern in the Ownership, Control and the Governance of Large Corporations in France and Germany, with a Note on the U.K." (paper presented at the annual meetings of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle, WA, 22 March 1996).
60. For these different mechanisms and the styles of institutionalist analysis from which they derive, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44, no. 4 (1996): 936-57, and the debate between these authors and Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott in Political Studies 46, no. 5 (1998): 951-62.
61. For these different mechanisms and the styles of institutionalist analysis from which they derive, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44, no. 4 (1996): 936-57, and the debate between these authors and Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott in Political Studies 46, no. 5 (1998): 951-62.
62. Rainer Funke, parliamentary state secretary of the Justice Ministry, quoted in the Financial Times, 27 February 1997, 11.
63. "Bonner Regierung scheut Einschnitte in die Eckpfeiler der Bankenmacht," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 September 1996; Beat Gygi, "Suche nach 'besserer' Unternehmenskontrolle: Debatte über die Reform des deutschen Aktienrechts," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 November 1996.
64. "Bonner Regierung scheut Einschnitte in die Eckpfeiler der Bankenmacht," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 September 1996; Beat Gygi, "Suche nach 'besserer' Unternehmenskontrolle: Debatte über die Reform des deutschen Aktienrechts," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 November 1996.
65. Financial Times, 11 April 1996 and 24 June 1996.
66. Interview, Ministry of Justice, Bonn, June 1998. The evolving views of Calpers on corporate governance in Japan, France, and Germany are available on its Web site (www. calpers.ca.gov/invest/corpgov/cggermany.htm). In 1996, Calpers was primarily concerned with U.S.-based efforts to bring more "outsiders" or nonmanagement directors to American boards - a priority that at best addressed indirectly the tensions within Germany's two-board system.
67. "Zusammenstellung der Stellungnahmen zur öffentlichen Anhörung des Rechtsausschusses . . ., 29 January 1997 (Bonn: typescript, 30 January 1997).
68. Ibid.
69. Interviews, Office of Margareta Wolf, Green Party spokeswoman for economics, finance, research, and technology, Bonn, June 1999; Office of Hans-Martin Bury, SPD (Social Democrats) spokesman for economic, finance, and technology, Bonn, June 1999. For the Greens' position on corporate governance, see the published version of a roundtable, held 5 March 1997, in Das Deutsche Bankensystem: Innovationsbremse oder Erfolgsgarant? (Bonn, Germany: Bundestagsfraktion BÜNDNIS 90/Die Grünen, May 1997).
70. Handelsblatt, 6-7 March 1997, 6. My thanks to John Cioffi for reminding me of this provision's significance.
71. Karl Otto Pohl, "Frankfurt im Konkurrenzkampf der Finanzplätze neue Rahmenbedingungen sind schnell erforderlich," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 June 1989. For the regional stock markets, see Susanne Lütz, "The Revival of the Nation-State? Stock Exchange Regulation in an Era of Internationalized Financial Markets," Discussion Paper 96/9, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, December 1996.
72. Karl Otto Pohl, "Frankfurt im Konkurrenzkampf der Finanzplätze neue Rahmenbedingungen sind schnell erforderlich," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 June 1989. For the regional stock markets, see Susanne Lütz, "The Revival of the Nation-State? Stock Exchange Regulation in an Era of Internationalized Financial Markets," Discussion Paper 96/9, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, December 1996.
73. Financial Times, 27 February 1995, 11.
74. Figures from Lanoo, "A European Perspective," 274. The corresponding figure for the market valuation of all British firms as a proportion of British gross domestic product (GDP) was 193.7 percent.
75. "Germans Dive into the Equity Culture: Deutsche Telekom Shares Surge," Financial Times, 19 November 1996, 1; J. Nicholas Ziegler, "The Politics of Privatization and Restructuring in Germany," Working Paper no. 3880, MIT Sloan School, October 1997.
76. "Germans Dive into the Equity Culture: Deutsche Telekom Shares Surge," Financial Times, 19 November 1996, 1; J. Nicholas Ziegler, "The Politics of Privatization and Restructuring in Germany," Working Paper no. 3880, MIT Sloan School, October 1997.
77. Figures from the dpa (deutsche Presseagentur), November 1996, and available (as of May 1999) at the Web site for Deutsche Telekom (http://www.dtag.de/untern/inv_ relations/forum/right.htm).
78. In keeping with the more closed nature of financial governance in Germany, the German financial press reported on these cross-listings in notably less detail than English-language publications. The best accounts on these particular cross-listings are from Euromoney (April 1995), Euromoney (May 1995), and Economist (17 September 1994). For the reconciliation of Deutsche Telekom's 1996 accounts, see the company's Geschäftsbericht (Annual Report), 1996.
79. In keeping with the more closed nature of financial governance in Germany, the German financial press reported on these cross-listings in notably less detail than English-language publications. The best accounts on these particular cross-listings are from Euromoney (April 1995), Euromoney (May 1995), and Economist (17 September 1994). For the reconciliation of Deutsche Telekom's 1996 accounts, see the company's Geschäftsbericht (Annual Report), 1996.
80. In keeping with the more closed nature of financial governance in Germany, the German financial press reported on these cross-listings in notably less detail than English-language publications. The best accounts on these particular cross-listings are from Euromoney (April 1995), Euromoney (May 1995), and Economist (17 September 1994). For the reconciliation of Deutsche Telekom's 1996 accounts, see the company's Geschäftsbericht (Annual Report), 1996.
81. In keeping with the more closed nature of financial governance in Germany, the German financial press reported on these cross-listings in notably less detail than English-language publications. The best accounts on these particular cross-listings are from Euromoney (April 1995), Euromoney (May 1995), and Economist (17 September 1994). For the reconciliation of Deutsche Telekom's 1996 accounts, see the company's Geschäftsbericht (Annual Report), 1996.
82. Interviews, Ministry of Justice, Bonn, June 1999. For a report on the similarities and differences between international accounting standards (IAS) and U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), from the viewpoint of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), see Carrie Bloomer, ed., The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project (Norwalk, CT: FASB, 1996).
83. Euromoney, May 1995; and Economist, 17 September 1994.
84. Euromoney, May 1995; and Economist, 17 September 1994.
85. Marianne Kulicke, u.a., Chancen und Risiken junger Technologieunternehmen: Ergebnisse des Modellversuchs "Förderung technologieorientierter Unternehmensgründungen" (Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1993).
86. Peter Glotz and Uwe Thomas, Das dritte Wirtschaftswunder: Aufbruch in eine neue Gründerzeit (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1994).
87. Results of the study, by the Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung (ipos), appeared on the Web site of the Federal Association of German Banks (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken) - http:www.bdb.de/presse/interes/aktuell.htm - under the heading "Deutschland: Die Aktienkultur gewinnt an Tiefe" in June 1999. See also "Aktienfonds stehen bei Anlegern an erster Stelle," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 1999.
88. Results of the study, by the Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung (ipos), appeared on the Web site of the Federal Association of German Banks (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken) - http:www.bdb.de/presse/interes/aktuell.htm - under the heading "Deutschland: Die Aktienkultur gewinnt an Tiefe" in June 1999. See also "Aktienfonds stehen bei Anlegern an erster Stelle," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 November 1999.
89. On the steel industry, see esp. Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach, "Crisis Management 'Made in Germany': The Steel Industry," in Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic, P. J. Katzenstein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 221-48.
90. This account is based on interviews with representatives of the regional government of North Rhine Westphalia and IG Metall in Düsseldorf, June 1998 and June 1999, as well as the documentary sources cited below.
91. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March 1997.
92. Interviews, Landespresseamt, North Rhine Westphalia, Düsseldorf, June 1999.
93. "Regierungserklärung des Ministers für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie und Verkehr, Wolfgang Clement, vor dem Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen am 20. Marz 1997 zur aktuellen Situation in der Stahlindustrie" (issued by the regional government of North Rhine Westphalia, 20 March 1997).
94. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March 1997; and Sunday Times (London), 30 March 1997.
95. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 March 1997; and Sunday Times (London), 30 March 1997.
96. "Grundsatzvereinbarung zur Bildung von 'Thyssen Krupp Stahl" unterzeichnet" (Presseerklärung, Düsseldorf/Essen, 16 March 1997).
97. Press conference by Dr. Gerhard Cromme, Villa Hügel, Essen, 28 March 1998.
98. For additional information on new arrangements for labor-management cooperation in firm-level strategy and change, see the important Report of the Commission on Codetermination, Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung und Hans-Böckler Stiftung, 1998).
99. Interview, IG Metall, Zweigstelle Düsseldorf, June 1998.
100. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Stability and Change in the Emerging Third Republic," in Katzenstein, Industry and Politics.
101. Kathleen Thelen, "Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Dismantle the German," in Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice, eds., Unions, Employers and Central Banks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
102. "The UAW's Next Battleground," Business Week, 26 July 1999, 28-29.
103. "Unions to Decide on DaimlerChrysler Seat," Detroit Free Press, 19 May 1998; and "UAW Wins Seat on Daimler Board," Detroit Free Press, 28 May 1998.
104. "Unions to Decide on DaimlerChrysler Seat," Detroit Free Press, 19 May 1998; and "UAW Wins Seat on Daimler Board," Detroit Free Press, 28 May 1998.
105. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
106. Choice-theoretic accounts grapple with this problem as an extreme example of the unintended consequences of institutional change, which can disappoint actors who opt for particular institutional alternatives only to find that the chosen arrangements do not produce the expected benefits. For discussion of this issue in the context of property rights, see Jack Knight and Douglass C. North, "Explaining the Complexity of Institutional Change," in David L. Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 354.
107. For the general difficulty involved in imputing "prepolitical" preferences and focusing analysis on the way actors with fixed preferences proceed, see Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 21-23.
108. Lanoo, "A European Perspective," 280.
109. The "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance" were developed at the request of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council meeting of 27-28 April 1998 and published on the OECD Web site (http://oecd.org/dag/ governance/principles.htm) on 18 May 1999.