The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy

Review of Austrian Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 259-279

  Festré, Agnès ^a   Garrouste, Pierre ^b  

^a GREDEG CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Coherence; Emergence and evolution; Hayek; Relevance; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350031430     PISSN: 08893047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11138-009-0083-7     Document Type: Article

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