Fitting attitude analyses of value and the partiality challenge

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 365-378

  Olson, Jonas ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

A. C. Ewing; FA analyses; Fittingness; Ought; Partiality; Value; Wrong kind of reason problem

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350006906     PISSN: 13862820     EISSN: 15728447     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9176-4     Document Type: Article

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