Combining teleological ethics with evaluator relativism: A promising result

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 95-113

  Portmore, Douglas W ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947643466     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00217.x     Document Type: Article

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