A basic tool set for a generalized directional model

Public Choice

Volumn 140, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 85-104

  Linhart, Eric ^a   Shikano, Susumu ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Directional models; Proximity models; Spatial model

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349900727     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9413-3     Document Type: Article

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