Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: An experimental analysis

Experimental Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 289-317

  Datta Mago, Shakun ^a   Dechenaux, Emmanuel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capacity constraint; Dominant firm; Experiment; Game of timing

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349796220     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9216-x     Document Type: Article

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