To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 240-264

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Müller, Wieland ^b   Normann, Hans Theo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036170487     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0889     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. "Commitment and Observability in Games"
2. "On Flexibility in Oligopoly"
3. "Z-Tree, Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments"
4. "An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining"
5. "Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria"
6. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
7. "An Experimental Test of the Consistent-Conjectures Hypothesis"
8. "Perfect versus Imperfect Observability: An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result"
9. "Stackelberg beats Cournot-On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets"
10. "Simultaneous and Sequential Price Competition on Heterogeneous Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence"
11. "Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions"
12. "Quantity Setting Oligopoly with Endogenous Sequencing"
13. "Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Incomplete Information"
14. "Stackelberg and Marshall"
15. "Cournot Duopoly with Two Production Periods"
16. "Equilibrium Refinements for Infinite Normal-Form Games"
17. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership"