Game theory and international environmental policy

Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 317-343

  Kilgour, D Marc ^a   Wolinsky Nahmias, Yael ^b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349746570     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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