Open economy politics: A critical review

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 219-244

  Lake, David A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Economies of scale; Globalization; Institutions; Optimal tariffs; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349592387     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-009-9060-y     Document Type: Article

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