Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 305-321

  Wulf, Julie ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Firm investment; Influence activities; Internal capital markets; M form organization; Signal jamming

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349467733     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.001     Document Type: Article

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