The open-source fixed-point model checker for symbolic analysis of security protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5705 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 166-194

  Mödersheim, Sebastian ^a   Viganò, Luca ^b  

^a IBM RESEARCH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VERONA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES; ALGEBRAIC THEORIES; CONSTRAINT-BASED; INTERMEDIATE FORMATS; MODEL CHECKER; ON-THE-FLY; OPEN-SOURCE; PARTIAL-ORDER REDUCTION; POINT-BASED; PROTOCOL GOAL; PROTOCOL VERIFICATION; REDUCTION TECHNIQUES; SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; STYLE LANGUAGES; SYMBOLIC ANALYSIS; SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION; TRANSITION SYSTEM;

ALGEBRA; CRYPTOGRAPHY; LINGUISTICS; MODEL CHECKING; NETWORK SECURITY; QUERY LANGUAGES; SPECIFICATIONS;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 70349335930     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_6     Document Type: Conference Paper

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