An improved constraint-based system for the verification of security protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2477, Issue , 2002, Pages 326-341

  Corin, Ricardo ^a   Etalle, Sandro ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

^b CWI   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NETWORK SECURITY;

CONSTRAINT-BASED; EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION; MONOTONIC BEHAVIOR; PRACTICAL SYSTEMS; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; SYSTEM FEATURES;

STATIC ANALYSIS;

EID: 84958742278     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45789-5_24     Document Type: Conference Paper

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