LTL model checking for security protocols

Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 385-396

  Armando, Alessandro ^a   Carbone, Roberto ^a   Compagna, Luca ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^b SAP RESEARCH   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS (INFORMATION THEORY); NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY OF DATA;

EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT; FAKE MESSAGES; MALICIOUS AGENT;

MODEL CHECKING;

EID: 35048868416     PISSN: 19401434     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2007.24     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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