A tool for lazy verification of security protocols

Proceedings - 16th Annual International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2001

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 373-376

  Chevalier, Y ^a   Vigneron, L ^a  

^a LORIA   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY; NETWORK SECURITY;

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; PROPERTY; REWRITE RULES; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; SEMI-AUTOMATIC TOOLS;

PROGRAM COMPILERS;

EID: 84944686372     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ASE.2001.989832     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (17)

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