Farsightedly stable networks

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 526-541

  Herings, P Jean Jacques ^a   Mauleon, Ana ^b,c   Vannetelbosch, Vincent ^c  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b FNRS   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Farsighted players; Networks; Pairwise deviations; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349330244     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.009     Document Type: Article

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