A characterization of stochastically stable networks

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 351-369

  Tercieux, Olivier ^a,b   Vannetelbosch, Vincent ^c,d  

^a Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

^c FNRS   (Belgium)

^d UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Network formation; Pairwise stability; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749388221     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0024-7     Document Type: Article

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