Managerial control of voting rights. Financing policies and the market for corporate control

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 20, Issue C, 1988, Pages 25-54

  Stulz, RenéM ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45549112378     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90039-6     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Tender offers and management resistance
2. The rationale behind interfirm tender offers: Information or synergy?
3. Convertible bonds Valuation and optimal strategies for call and conversion
4. Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders
5. Standstill agreements, privately negotiated stock repurchases and the market for corporate control
6. Corporate financial policy and corporate control: A study of defensive adjustments in asset and ownership structure
7. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock
8. ‘Antitakeover’ charter amendments and stockholder wealth
9. Takeover bids the free-rider problems and the theory of the corporation
10. A sequential signalling model of convertible debt call policy
11. Corporate control contests and capital structure
12. An examination of corporate call policies on convertible securities
13. Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980
14. Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance, and takeover
15. The takeover controversy: Analysis and evidence
16. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
17. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence
18. Golden parachutes, shark repellents and hostile tender offers
19. Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth
20. The market value of control in publicly traded corporations
21. The market value of differential voting rights in closely held corporations
22. Information asymmetries financial structure and financial intermediation
23. Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock
24. An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices
25. Stock repurchase by tender offer An analysis of the causes of common stock price changes
26. Convertible calls and security returns
27. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis
28. Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical analysis
29. The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth
30. The impact of preferred-for-common exchange offers on firm value
31. Optimal auctions
32. Repurchase offers: Information adjusted premiums and shareholder's response
33. Large shareholders and corporate control
34. Greenmail white knights and shareholder's interest
35. Investment banking and the capital acquisition process
36. Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance: Bankruptcies and takeovers
37. Common stock repurchases and market signalling
38. Predicting tender offer success A logistic analysis
39. Agency theory managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance