Introduction: Unipolarity, state behavior, and systemic consequences

World Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-27

  John Ikenberry, G ^a   Mastanduno, Michael ^a   Wohlforth, William C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICS; STATE ROLE;

EID: 69249125410     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S004388710900001X     Document Type: Review

References (102)

1. See Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions and Research Design," in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 2003).
2. G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002);
3. and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortman, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21" Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). On incipient balancing,
4. see Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism, after the Cold War," International Security 24 (Summer 2000);
5. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security 17 (Spring 1993);
6. Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30 (Summer 2005);
7. and Keir Lieber and, Gerard, Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30 (Summer 2005).
8. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
9. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958);
10. and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger'(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
11. See Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and. International, Stability," World Politics 16 (April 1964);
12. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Mutilpolarity and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 (September 1966);
13. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus 93 (Summer 1964);
14. and Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957).
15. For example, Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Responses to American Primacy (New York: Norton, 2006);
16. Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," Washington Quarterly 29 (Summer 2006).
17. A huge literature has emerged-or returned-depicting America as an empire. See, for example, Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006);
18. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004);
19. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). On hegemony,
20. see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On imperium,
21. see Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, University Press, 2006). On uni-multipolarity,
22. see Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78 (March-April 1999).
23. In this way, we are following a basic distinction made in the power theory literature. See, in particular, David A. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
24. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1979), 131.
25. For a comprehensive critical review of the polarity literature, see Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
26. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International'Security 21 (Summer 1999);
27. idem, "U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World," in Ikenberry (fn. 2);
28. Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
29. Some scholars argue that bipolarity or multipolarity might characterize international, politics in certain regional settings. See, for example, Robert Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security 23 (Spring 1999);
30. and Andrew Moravcsik, "The Quiet Superpower," Newsweek, June 17 2002.
31. See, e.g., Ethan B. Kapstein, "Does Unipolarity Have A Future?" in Kapstein and Michael, Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999);
32. Birthe Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's, 2000);
33. Wohlforth (fn. 10, 1999, 2002);
34. Brooks and Wohlforth (fn. 10);
35. William, E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, America's Inadvertent Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004);
36. and Arvind Virmani, "Global Power from the 18th to the 21st Century: Power Potential (VIP2), Strategic Assets and Actual Power (VIP)," Working Paper no. 175 (New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International, Economic Relations, 2005). The most comprehensive contrarian view is Michael Mann, whose main arguments are that the United States is weaker economically that it seems (a claim mainly about the future) and that U.S. military capability is comparatively ineffective at achieving favorable outcomes (a claim about utility);
37. Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003)
38. Calculated from. Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2005: Historical Tables (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2005).
39. Sustained U.S. investment in nuclear capabilities, against the backdrop of Russian decline and Chinese stasis, have even led some to question the existence of stable deterrence between these countries. See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30 (Spring 2006).
40. David Wilkinson, "Unipolarity without Hegemony," International Studies Review 1 (Spring 1999);
41. Hansen (fn. 12);
42. Stuart Kaufman, Richard, Little, and William Wohlforth, eds., The Balance of Power in World History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007);
43. and Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security 28 (Fall 2003).
44. "The Eagle Has Landed: The New U.S. Global Military Position," Financial Times Weekend, February 1, 2002.
45. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan and Company, 1939);
46. Organski (fn. 3);
47. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back, In," International Security 19 (Summer 1994);
48. and Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics 48 (January 1996).
49. Gilpin (fn. 3), chap. 2.
50. See, for example, Ronald, L.Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, Alan C. Stam III, and A. F. K. Organski, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000);
51. Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (December 1999);
52. and Jason Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
53. Josef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Unipolarity," International Security 19 (Spring 1995);
54. and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security 21 (Spring 1997).
55. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and the literature discussed therein.
56. Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
57. This literature is vast, and its claims have been subject to considerable critical scrutiny. Key statements include Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973);
58. Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in Alexander L. George, Ole R. Holsti, and Randolph M. Siverson, Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980);
59. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International, Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976);
60. Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony," International Organization 39 (Spring 1985);
61. Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985);
62. David A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly 37 (December 1993);
63. and Joanne Gowa, "Rational, Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?" World Politics 41 (April 1989).
64. See Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from Soviet Asset to Liability," International Organization 39 (Winter 1985);
65. and Randall Stone, Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
66. Waltz (fn. 8).
67. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
68. Ikenberry (fn. 6).
69. Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2 (July 1957); Baldwin (fn. 7).
70. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1863), 1: 299-300.
71. Theodore Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: Harper Collins 1989);
72. and Stephen Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of Internal Weakness and External Strength," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
73. For example, David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992);
74. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002);
75. and Robert Pastor, "The President vs. Congress," in Robert Art and Seyom Brown, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for a New Role (New York: MacMillan, 1993).
76. See Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of States," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975);
77. and Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978).
78. See the reviews and discussion in Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design," in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 2003);
79. and Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Security Studies 14 (January-March 2005).
80. See, for example, Glen H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, University Press, 1997);
81. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" Journal of International Affairs 43 (Summer-Fall 1989);
82. idem, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39 (Spring 1997);
83. and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical, Reality versus Neorealist Theory," International Security 19 (Winter 1994).
84. See Schroeder (fn. 34); and R. Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization 47 (Winter 1993).
85. Keohane (fn. 21);
86. Ikenberry (fn. 6).
87. See the discussion in Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997), chap. 3;
88. and idem, "Unipolarity: A Structural. Perspective," in this issue.
89. See Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999);
90. and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
91. See Gilpin (fn. 3);
92. Tammen et al. (fn. 19);
93. and Levy and DiCiccio (fn. 19).
94. Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (London: Routledge, 2005), 31.
95. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security 14 (Spring 1993);
96. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International, Politics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993);
97. and idem, "Structural Realism, after the Cold War," in Ikenberry (fn. 2).
98. See also the retrospective in Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," InternationalSecurity 31 (Winter 2006).
99. See Jonathan Caverley, "United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense," Security Studies 16 (October 2007).
100. Gilpin (fn 3).
101. Ibid., 75.
102. Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," in Kapstein and Mastanduno (fn. 12).