Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 173, Issue 15, 2009, Pages 1441-1455

  Ashlagi, Itai ^a   Monderer, Dov ^b   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^b,c  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^c MICROSOFT   (United States)

Author keywords

Ignorance; Routing games; Safety level equilibrium; Splittable; unsplittable

Indexed keywords

IGNORANCE; ROUTING GAMES; SAFETY-LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM; SPLITTABLE; UNSPLITTABLE;

COST FUNCTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 68049139230     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2009.07.002     Document Type: Article

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