On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 192-205

  Arguedas, Carmen ^a   van Soest, Daan P ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Abatement technology adoption; Asymmetric information; Environmental policy; Investment subsidies

Indexed keywords

ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; EMISSION TAXES; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES; INVESTMENT SUBSIDY; NEW TECHNOLOGIES;

COST REDUCTION; INVESTMENTS; TECHNOLOGY;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY; INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT; POLLUTION TAX; PROFITABILITY; STATE ROLE; SUBSIDY SYSTEM; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

EID: 68049092136     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.002     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Aidt T.S. Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy. Journal of Public Economics 69 (1998) 1-16
2. Alberini A., and Segerson K. Assessing voluntary programs to improve environmental quality. Environment and Resource Economics 22 (2002) 157-184
3. Antonelli C. The Economics of Innovation, New Technologies and Structural Change (2003), Routledge, New York
4. Baumol W.J., and Oates W.E. The Theory of Environmental Policy (1988), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
5. Bellas A.S. Empirical evidence of advances in scrubber technology. Resource and Energy Economics 20 (1998) 327-343
6. 2 allowance trading: how do expectations and experience measure up?. Electricity Journal 10 7 (1997) 67-75
7. Brezis E.S., Krugman P.R., and Tsiddon D. Leapfrogging in international competition: a theory of cycles in national technological leadership. American Economic Review 83 5 (1993) 1211-1219
8. Carraro C., and Siniscalco D. Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: a theoretical appraisal. In: Xepapadeas A. (Ed). Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources (1996), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 80-94
9. Dasgupta P., Hammond P., and Maskin E. On imperfect information and optimal pollution control. Review of Economic Studies 47 (1980) 857-860
10. De Mooij R. The double dividend of an environmental tax reform. In: van den Bergh J.C.J.M. (Ed). Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics (2002), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 293-306
11. Dietz F.J., and Vollebergh H.R.J. Explaining instrument choice in environmental policies. In: van den Bergh J.C.J.M. (Ed). Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics (1999), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 339-351
12. Fredriksson P.G. Environmental policy choice: pollution abatement subsidies. Resource and Energy Economics 20 (1997) 51-63
13. Fudenberg D., and Tirole J. Game Theory (1992), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
14. Fullerton D., and Mohr R. Suggested subsidies are suboptimal unless combined with an output tax. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 2 1 (2003) (Article 1)
15. Fullerton D., and Wolverton A. The case for a two-part instrument: presumptive tax and environmental subsidy. In: Panagariya A., Portney P.R., and Schwab R.M. (Eds). Environmental and Public Economics: Essays in Honour of Wallace E. Oates (1999), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
16. Jaffe A.B., Newell R.G., and Stavins R.N. Environmental policy and technological change. Environmental and Resource Economics 22 (2002) 41-69
17. Jaffe A.B., and Stavins R.N. Dynamic incentives of environmental regulations: the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29 3 (1995) S43-S63
18. Jenkins G.P., and Lamech R. Fiscal policies to control pollution: international experience. Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 46 (1992) 483-502
19. Johnson P., McKay S., and Smith S. The Distributional Consequences of Environmental Taxes. IFS Commentaries C23 (1990), Institute for Fiscal Studies, London
20. Joskow P.L., and Maron D.B. What does a negawatt really cost? Evidence from utility conservation programs. The Energy Journal 13 4 (1992) 46-55
21. Jung Ch., Krutilla K., and Boyd R. Incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level: an evaluation of policy alternatives. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30 (1996) 95-111
22. Kerr S., and Newell R.G. Policy-induced technology adoption: evidence from the U.S. lead phasedown. Journal of Industrial Economics 51 3 (2003) 317-343
23. Khanna M. Non-mandatory approaches to environmental protection. Journal of Economic Surveys 15 3 (2001) 291-324
24. Kim J.C., and Chang K.B. An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics 5 (1993) 183-197
25. Laffont J.J., and Tirole J. Pollution permits and compliance strategies. Journal of Public Economics 62 (1996) 85-125
26. Laffont J.J., and Tirole J. Pollution permits and environmental innovation. Journal of Public Economics 62 (1996) 127-140
27. Lewis T.R. Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known. RAND Journal of Economics 27 4 (1996) 819-847
28. Loeb M., and Magat W.A. A decentralized method for utility regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1979) 399-404
29. M. Lovei, Phasing out lead from gasoline: worldwide experience and policy implications, World Bank Technical Paper 397, Washington DC, The World Bank, 1998.
30. Malm E. An actions-based estimate of the free rider fraction in electric utility DSM programs. The Energy Journal 17 3 (1996) 41-48
31. Malueg D.A. Emission credit trading and the incentive to adopt new pollution abatement technology. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16 1 (1989) 52-57
32. Milliman S.R., and Prince R. Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 17 (1989) 247-265
33. Nelissen D., and Requate T. Pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological progress. International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology 6 (2007) 5-44
34. OECD, Applying Economic Instruments to Environmental Policies in OECD and Dynamic Non-member Countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1994.
35. OECD, Voluntary Approaches: Two Danish Cases, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2003.
36. OECD/IEA, Policies and Measures Data Base: Climate Change, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Energy Agency, Paris, 2008.
37. Parry I.W.H. A second-best analysis of environmental subsidies. International Tax and Public Finance 5 2 (1998) 153-170
38. Palmer K., Oates W.E., and Portney P. Tightening environmental standards: the benefit costs or the no-cost paradigm?. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 4 (1995) 119-132
39. Porter M.E., and van der Linde C. Towards a new concept of the environmental-competitiveness issue. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 4 (1995) 97-118
40. Requate T. Incentives to adopt new technologies under different pollution-control policies. International Tax and Public Finance 2 (1995) 295-317
41. Requate T. Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradable permits. European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998) 139-165
42. Requate T. Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments: a survey. Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 175-195
43. Requate T., and Unold W. Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology: will the true ranking please stand up?. European Economic Review 47 1 (2003) 125-146
44. Ruggeri G. The marginal cost of public funds in closed and small open economies. Fiscal Studies 20 1 (1999) 41-60
45. Schneider S.H., and Goulder L.H. Achieving low-cost emissions targets. Nature 389 4 September (1997) 13-14
46. K. Segerson, Do voluntary approaches lead to efficient environmental protection? European Research Network on Voluntary Approaches, CAVA, Working Paper No. 99:10, 1999.
47. Sheriff G. Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55 (2008) 72-89
48. Spulber D.F. Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information. Journal of Public Economics 35 (1988) 163-181
49. Stranlund J. Public technological aid to support compliance to environmental standards. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 34 (1997) 228-239
50. Stavins R.N. Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments. In: Mäler K.G., and Vincent J. (Eds). The Handbook of Environmental Economics (2003), Elsevier Science, North-Holland
51. UNEP, Reforming Energy Subsidies, United Nations Environment Programme, New York, 2008.
52. Wirl F. Conservation incentives for consumers. Journal of Regulatory Economics 15 1 (1999) 23-40
53. Wirl F. Lessons from utility conservation programs. Energy Journal 21 1 (2000) 87-108
54. Wirl F., and Orasch W. Analysis of United States' utility conservation programs. Review of Industrial Organization 13 4 (1998) 467-486
55. Wu J.J., and Babcock B.A. Contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 (1996) 935-945