Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 51-63

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Instrument choice; Lobbying; Pollution abatement subsidy; Pollution tax

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; LOBBYING; POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM; POLLUTION ABATEMENT; POLLUTION TAX; SUBSIDY;

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING; POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT; PUBLIC POLICY; TAXATION;

POLLUTION CONTROL;

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; POLLUTION CONTROL; POLLUTION TAX;

EID: 0032029623     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0928-7655(97)00011-0     Document Type: Article

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