Quantifying the cost of excess market thickness in timber sale auctions

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 553-566

  Zheng, Xiaoyong ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Entry; Excess market thickness; Timber auctions

Indexed keywords

ENDOGENOUS ENTRY; ENTRY; EXCESS MARKET THICKNESS; EXPECTED REVENUE; OPTIMAL NUMBER; POTENTIAL BIDDERS; SOCIAL WELFARE; TIMBER SALES; WELFARE LOSS;

COST ACCOUNTING; TIMBER;

COMMERCE;

EID: 67849101174     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.01.005     Document Type: Article

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