Auctioning and bargaining: An econometric study of timber auctions with secret reservation prices

Journal of Business and Economic Statistics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 209-220

  Elyakime, Bernar ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^b   Loisel, Patrice ^a   Vuong, Quang ^c  

^a CEMAGREF   (France)

^b INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Nonlinear least squares; Nonparametric identification; Numerical integration; Private values; Structural modeling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031504034     PISSN: 07350015     EISSN: 15372707     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07350015.1997.10524701     Document Type: Article

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