On meaningfulness and truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 433-482

  McDonald, Brian Edison ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Liar; Meaningfulness; Paradox; Truth; Variational semantics

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849108261     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026528019554     Document Type: Review

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