Chapter 11 Natural Kantian or ZOO ECONOMICUS? Evolutionary theories of selfishness and altruism among men and beasts

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 771-817

  Bergstrom, Theodore C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

altruism; assortative matching; biology; cooperation; evolutionary games; generalized prisoners' dilemma; group selection; haystack model; linear public goods game; punishment; reciprocity; selfishness

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649381859     PISSN: 15740714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01011-6     Document Type: Review

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