Chapter 23 Strong reciprocity and the welfare state

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Volumn 2, Issue , 2006, Pages 1439-1464

  Fong, Christina M ^a   Bowles, Samuel ^b   Gintis, Herbert ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^c Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

distributive justice; equity; fairness; reciprocity; redistribution; welfare states

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649342206     PISSN: 15740714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02023-9     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. Abbink, K., Bolton, G.E., Sadrieh, A., Tang, F.-F. (1996). "Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining". Discussion Paper No B0-381, University of Bonn
2. Alesina A., Glaeser E., and Sacerdote B. Why doesn't the United States have a European-style welfare state?. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (2001) 187-278
3. Andreoni J. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public good experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37 (1988) 291-304
4. Andreoni J. Cooperation in Public goods experiments: kindness or confusion. American Economic Review 85 4 (1995) 891-904
5. Atkinson A.B. The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State (1999), MIT Press, Cambridge
6. Besley T., and Coate S. Understanding welfare stigma: taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination. Journal of Public Economics 48 1 (1992) 165-183
7. Blount S. When social outcomes aren't fair: the effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 63 2 (1995) 131-144
8. Boehm Ch. Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies (1984), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA
9. Bowles S., and Gintis H. Schooling, skills and earnings: a principal-agent approach. In: Arrow K., Bowles S., and Durlauf S. (Eds). Meritocracy and Economic Inequality (1998), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
10. Bowles S., and Gintis H. Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for Markets, States, and Communities. In: Wright E.O. (Ed) (1999), Verso, London
11. Bowles S., and Gintis H. The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology 65 (2004) 17-28
12. Bowles S., and Gintis H. The origins of human cooperation. In: Hammerstein P. (Ed). Genetic and Cultural Origins of Cooperation (2004), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
13. Bowles, S., Carptenter, J., Gintis, H. (2001). "Mutual monitoring in teams: the importance of shame and punishment", University of Massachusetts
14. Bowles S., Choi J.-K., and Hopfensitz A. The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology 223 (2003) 135-147
15. Boyd R., Gintis H., Bowles S., and Richerson P.J. Evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 6 (2003) 3531-3535
16. Brewer M.B., and Miller N. Intergroup Relations (1996), Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, CA
17. Camerer C., and Thaler R. Ultimatums, dictators, and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 2 (1995) 209-219
18. Cameron L.A. Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: experimental evidence from Indonesia. Economic Inquiry 37 1 (1999) 47-59
19. Coleman J.S. Free riders and zealots: the role of social networks. Sociological Theory 6 (1988) 52-57
20. Deutsch M. Distributive Justice (1985), Yale University Press, New Haven
21. Eckel C., and Grossman Ph. Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior 16 (1996) 181-191
22. Edda. Havamal. In: Clarke D.E.M. (Ed). The Havamal, with Selections from other Poems in the Edda (1923), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
23. Falk, A., Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. (2002). "Testing theories of fairness and reciprocity-intentions matter," University of Zurich
24. Farkas S., and Robinson J. The Values we Live By: What Americans Want from Welfare Reform (1996), Public Agenda, New York
25. Fehr E., and Schmidt K.M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 817-868
26. Fehr E., and Gächter S. Cooperation and punishment. American Economic Review 90 4 (2000) 980-994
27. Fehr E., and Gächter S. Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 3 (2000) 159-181
28. Fehr E., and Gächter S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415 (2002) 137-140
29. Fehr E., Gächter S., and Kirchsteiger G. Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence. Econometrica 65 4 (1997) 833-860
30. Fong Ch.M. Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. Journal of Public Economics 82 2 (2001) 225-246
31. Fong, Ch.M. (2003). "Empathic responsiveness: evidence from a randomized experiment on giving to welfare recipients," Carnegie-Mellon University
32. Forsythe R., Horowitz J., Savin N.E., and Sefton M. Replicability, fairness and pay in experiments with simple bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 6 3 (1994) 347-369
33. Gallup Organization. Haves and Have-Nots: Perceptions of Fairness and Opportunity (1998), Gallup
34. Gilens M. Why Americans Hate Welfare (1999), University of Chicago Press
35. Gintis H. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206 (2000) 169-179
36. Güth W., Schmittberger R., and Schwarz B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (1982) 367-388
37. Hayek F. The Three Sources of Human Values (1978), London School of Economics, London
38. Heclo H. The political foundations of antipoverty policy. In: Danziger Sh.H., and Weinberg D.H. (Eds). Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't (1986), Harvard University Press, Cambridge 312-341
39. Kollock P. Transforming social dilemmas: group identity and cooperation. In: Danielson P. (Ed). Modeling Rational and Moral Agents (1997), Oxford University Press, Oxford
40. Kolm S.-Ch. La Bonne Economie: La Réciprocité Générale (1984), Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
41. Kolm S.-Ch. The logic of good social relations. Public and Cooperative Economics 71 2 (2000) 171-189
42. Kropotkin P. Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (1989 [1903]), Black Rose Books, New York
43. Lindbeck A., Nyberg S., and Weibull J. Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 1-35
44. Loewenstein G.F., Thompson L., and Bazerman M.H. Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 3 (1989) 426-441
45. Luttmer E.F.P. Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution. Journal of Political Economy 109 3 (2001) 500-528
46. Miller D. Principles of Social Justice (1999), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
47. Moffitt R. An economic model of welfare stigma. American Economic Review 73 (1983) 1023-1035
48. Moffitt R., Ribar D., and Wilhelm M. Decline of welfare benefits in the US: the role of wage inequality. Journal of Public Economics 68 3 (1998) 421-452
49. Moore Jr., B. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (1978), M.E. Sharpe, White Plains
50. Nisbett R.E., and Cohen D. Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South (1996), Westview Press, Boulder
51. Ostrom E., Walker J., and Gardner R. Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86 2 (1992) 404-417
52. Page B., and Shapiro R. Robert The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American's Policy Preferences (1992), University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London
53. Phelps E.S. Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-support to Free Enterprise (1997), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
54. Piketty Th. Social mobility and redistributive politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics CX 3 (1995) 551-584
55. Reif K., and Melich A. Euro-Barometer 31A: European Elections, 1989: Post-Election Survey, June-July 1989. In: ICPSR (Ed) (1993), Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI Conducted by Faits et Opinions, Paris. [Computer File]
56. Roberts K. Voting over income tax schedules. Journal of Public Economics 8 (1977) 329-340
57. Roemer J. A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993) 146-166
58. Roth A. Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel J., and Roth A. (Eds). The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
59. Sampson R.J., Raudenbush S.W., and Earls F. Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science 277 (1997) 918-924
60. Scott J.C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (1976), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT
61. Shiller R.J. Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society's Largest Economic Risks (1993), Clarendon Press, Oxford
62. Skitka L., and Tetlock Ph. Providing public assistance: cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 6 (1993) 1205-1223
63. Trivers R.L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971) 35-57
64. Walster E.G., Walster W., and Berscheid E. Equity, Theory and Research (1978), Allyn and Bacon, Boston
65. Weaver R.K., Shapiro R.Y., and Jacobs L.R. Poll trends: welfare. Public Opinion Quarterly 39 (1995) 606-627
66. Weiner B. Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of Social Conduct (1995), The Guilford Press, New York and London
67. Williamson J.B. Beliefs about the motivation of the poor and attitudes toward poverty policy. Social Problems 21 5 (1974) 734-747