Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction

Marketing Science

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 488-501

  Guo, Liang ^a   Zhao, Ying ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Communication; Competition; Disclosure; Information transmission; Quality

Indexed keywords

EID: 67449159219     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: 1526548X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1080.0418     Document Type: Article

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