Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 372-383

  Czarnitzki, Dirk ^a,c   Kraft, Kornelius ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^b TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^c CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Innovation; Limited dependent variables; Patents

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349178363     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.017     Document Type: Article

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