Reputation for cooperation: Contingent benefits in alliance activity

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 371-385

  Arend, Richard J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliance; Contingent benefits; Reputation

Indexed keywords

ALLIANCE; CONTINGENT BENEFITS; EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATIONS; ITERATED PRISONERS' DILEMMAS; REPUTATION; THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 65449166064     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.740     Document Type: Article

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