'We, the European people ... - Relâche?

European Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 147-167

  Ladeur, Karl Heinz ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65449133998     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00408.x     Document Type: Article

References (180)

1. See N. Walker, 'Europe's Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy', (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 211
2. N. Walker, 'Big "C" or Small "c"?', (2005) 12 European Law Journal 12
3. Ph. C. Schmitter, How to Democratise the European Union ... and why bother? (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)
4. M. Nettesheim, 'Developing a Theory of Democracy for the European Union', in J. H. H. Weiler (ed), Issues in Legal Scholarship: Richard Buxbaum and German Reunification (New York University, 2000), Art 13
5. A. von Bogdandy, 'The European Constitution and European Identity: Potentials and Dangers of the IGC's Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', in J. H. H. Weiler and C. L. Eisgruber (eds), Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU School of Law, 2004), at 1
6. U. Di Fabio, 'Die politische Gestalt Europas', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No 168, 22 July 2006, at 8
7. S. Oeter, 'Souveränität und Demokratie als Probleme der 'Verfassungsentwicklung' der EU', (1995) 58 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches und Völkerrecht 659
8. J. Habermas, 'Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung?', Die Zeit, No 27, 28 June 2001
9. for a critique, see A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998)
10. A. Moravcsik, 'What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?', (2006)47 Politische Viertejahresschrift 219
11. D. Grimm, 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?', (1995) 1 European Law Journal 282
12. for a critique of Habermas, see L. Thomassen, 'The Inclusion of the Other', (2006) 34 Political Theory 439
13. see the rather helpless comments after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty by G. De Búrca, 'After the Referenda', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 6
14. N. Walker, 'Big "C" or Small "c"', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 12.
15. For its theoretical foundations, see Habermas, op cit n 1 supra
16. O. Gerstenberg and Ch. F. Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy - An Institutional Ideal for Europe?', in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Markets, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Florence, 2002), at 289
17. from a legal point of view, see Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra
18. S. Griller and E. Rumler-Korinek, Democracy and New Modes of Governance in Europe. Some Basic Reflections, NewGov Project WP (August 2005)
19. for a theoretical critique, see A. J. Norval, 'Democratic Identification. A Wittgensteinian Approach', (2006) 34 Political Theory 229, at 241.
20. This seems to be N. Walker's hope: Walker, 'Europe's Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy', op cit n 1 supra.
21. For the supposed importance of the 'we feeling', see Walker, 'Europe's Constitutional Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy', op cit n 1 supra, at 212 - who is the bearer of this 'we feeling'? Is it not rather the professional community of constitutionalists who pronounce: 'We the constitutionalists ...'?
22. The convention is explicitly regarded as a product of 'deliberation' in the theoretical sense by Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra, at 38
23. see also D. Göler, Deliberation - Ein Zukunftsmodell europäischer Entscheidungsfindung? Analyse der Beratungen des Verfassungskonvents 2002-2003 (Nomos, 2006).
24. See, also, for the World Trad Organisation, J. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 623.
25. Y. Dotan, 'The Spillover Effect of Bill of Rights: A Comparative Assessment of the Impact of Bills of Rights in Canada and Israel', (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 293.
26. Nettesheim, , op cit n 1 supra, at 38.
27. B. Ackerman, We the People (Harvard University Press, 1991)
28. R. Hirschl, Hegemonic Preservation: Assessing the Political Origins of the European Constitution, NYU Jean Monnet Program (WP 5/04).
29. See the sceptical remarks of J. H. H. Weiler, 'In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg', in J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 7 and 8.
30. See also B. Ackerman, We the People. Foundations (Harvard University Press, 1991).
31. E. Marienstras, Nous le peuple américain (Gallimard, 1988).
32. This concept is used by Habermas also with respect to the European constitution: Op cit n 1 supra.
33. cf G. Brown, The Consent of the Governed. The Lockean Legacy in Early American Culture (Harvard University Press, 2001).
34. M. Schroer, Das Individuum der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 2001).
35. cf Weiler, op cit n 10 supra.
36. Brown, op cit n 15 supra.
37. cf for IrelandM. Kornprobst, 'Nation-Building and National Identity: The Reconstruction of Irishness', (2005) 11 Nations and Nationalism 403
38. generally A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
39. See generally K.-H. Ladeur, Der Staat gegen die Gesellschaft (Mohr, 2006).
40. J. C. Monier and M. Long, Portalis. L'esprit der justice (Michalon, 1997).
41. See C. F. von Gerber, System des Deutschen Privatrechts (Gustav Fischer, 7th edn, 1860).
42. K. H. Ladeur, 'The Postmodern Condition of Law and Societal Management of Rules', (2006) 27 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 87.
43. Dotan, op cit n 7 supra, at 293.
44. Habermas, op cit n 1 supra.
45. cf for cultural homogeneisation in revolutionary France R. Balibar and D. Laporte, Le français national. Politique et pratique de la langue française sous la Révolution (Hachette, 1974).
46. B. Yack, 'Rhetoric and Public Reasoning. An Aristotelian Understanding of Political Deliberation', (2006) 34 Political Theory 417, at 422.
47. Habermas, op cit n 1 supra
48. Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra
49. Gerstenberg and Sabel, op cit n 2 supra
50. see also Griller and Rumler-Korinek, op cit n 2 supra, at 24.
51. W. Pauly, Grundrechtslaboratorium Weimar (Mohr, 2004).
52. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Duncker and Humblot, 1928), at 31.
53. U. Mayer and G. Stuby (eds), Das lädierte Grundgesetz (Pahl-Rugenstein, 1977).
54. B. Guggenberger and T. Stein (eds), Die Verfassungsdiskussion im Jahr der deutschen Einheit (Hanser, 1991).
55. Habermas proposed a new 'social contract' among citizens instead of a reunification of the German states - whatever this means, quoted from (2000) 112 utopie kreativ 112.
56. R. B. Myerson, 'Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster', (2004) 160 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economy 187.
57. S. Burtt, 'The Politics of Virtue Today, A Critique and a Proposal', (1993) 87 American Political Science Review 360
58. G. Klosko, 'Rawls's "Political" Philosophy and American Democracy', (1993) 87 American Political Science Review 348.
59. The outcome of a constitutional constellation without a minimum of trust can be observed in the constitution of the US state of Alabama which probably has the longest constitution in history: It is full of details (certain measures to be taken in a certain county, specific rules about salaries of teachers, etc). This bizarre constitution is due to the racial split of the electorate in Alabama: The former white majority was afraid that increasing access of blacks to public authority at the local level could not be controlled by the state authorities sufficiently; see the website available at http://www.legislature.state.al.us/ constitution. The constitution has 210 sections and 773 amendments - it is even longer than the European Constitutional Treaty which is probably the second longest constitution: Including protocols it contains 474 pages ([2004] OJ C310/1). How long will a comprehensive commentary be?
60. For the 'embeddedness' of 'Europeanness' in national identity, see Th. Risse, 'Neofunctionalism. European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration', (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 291.
61. For the flexibility and multiplicity of 'identities', see W. Outhwaite, The Future of Society (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 71.
62. One has to be aware of the fact that 'identity' is one of the most obscure notions which have risen to prominence in recent debates. This is due to the shift from more objective approaches to more subjective reflections; cf from the point of view of psychoanalysis D.D. Odds, 'Identification: Psychoanalytic and Biological Perspectives', (2006) 54 Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association 17
63. identification in the past was regarded as the fundamental relationship to the 'Other' of tradition which has to be appropriated; in a cultural environment of narcissism 'identity' is a self-referential concept: J. C. Kaufmann, Ego - Pour une sociologie de l'individu (Nathan, 2001), which mirrors the new type of individualism which seems to be able to construct a 'stand alone' self which defines its relationship towards society in an autonomous way; this ambivalence is neglected in many discourses about 'identity'
64. cf Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra.
65. S. Chambers, 'Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy', (2004) 11 Constellations 153 et seq.
66. cf W. Becker, 'Ein Plädoyer gegen den Universalismus', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No 144, 14 June 2006, at 50 (against Habermas).
67. The most spectacular case in which a European court has shown that it is completely ignorant of the value of diversity in Europe is the case Caroline von Hannover (Monaco) v Germany, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-VI, judgment of 24 June 2004. We have (at least) three different regimes of balancing freedom of the press and protection of privacy: The liberal English version, the restrictive French version and a middle way in Germany. Why on earth does a European court feel competent to decide which one is the right one - in this case - to simplify - the French version? Such a concrete judgment could only be acceptable in a unitary constitutional domain. This case shows the risk of the loose talk about 'constitutionalism'; for a critique cf M. Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Constitutional Utopia or Fragmentation?, Chorley Lecture at the London School of Economics (6 June 2006).
68. cf D. Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung (Suhrkamp, 1998)
69. for the 'contemporary crisis of constitutionalism' cf C. F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Active Welfare, Experimental Governance, Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The NEW Transformation of Europe, Draft for the International Conference of the Hellenic Presidency of the EU: The Modernisation of the European Social Model and EU Policies and Instruments (21-22 May 2003), at 19 and 28.
70. cf J. T. Molot, 'The Rise and Fall of Textualism', (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1
71. J. F. Manning, 'What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?', (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 70.
72. S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006), at 280.
73. G. Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional Theory, Storrs Lecture 2003/4, Yale Law School.
74. Habermas, op cit n 1 supra.
75. This is the tendency of a speech given by M. Zürn, 'Facing the Twenth-First Century. Challenge to the State', in Hertie School of Governance (ed), The Role of the State in the Twenty-First Century (22-23 April 2004), at 51.
76. One should not forget about the miracles which were expected from an inclusive 'citizenship' expanded to immigrants - and the devastating effects of the German 'blood principle': U. K. Preuß and F. Requejo (eds), European Citizenship. Multiculture and the State (Nomos, 1998).
77. Habermas, op cit n 1 supra.
78. L. Trilling, The Opposing Self (Viking, 1979), at 146.
79. Zürn, op cit n 47 supra, at 48.
80. ibid, at 48.
81. The 'network' concept is often used in a loose way (Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra, at 32)
82. it should be specified with respect to 'some combination of informality, equality, and commitment': P. DiMaggio, 'Conclusion: The Futures of Business Organisation and Paradoxes of Change', in P. DiMaggio (ed), The Twenty-First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organisation in International Perspective (Princeton University Press, 2001), at 212 - I would add its functionality for a mode of generation of knowledge and management of uncertainty
83. cf for the concept of the 'disaggregated State' A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004)
84. see also A.-L. Barabási, Linked. The New Science of Networks (MIT Press, 2002), at 201, who stresses the element of knowledge generation as being the topical quality of networks.
85. G. Teubner, Netzwerk als Vertragsverbund (Nomos, 2004)
86. J. M. Guéhenno, The End of the Nation State (University of Minnesota Press, 1995)
87. J. M. Guéhenno, L'avenir de la liberté (Flammarion, 1999).
88. For the 'comitology' cf C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart, 1999)
89. the Commission's White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, regards it as a threat to its central position; A. Gatto, 'Governance in the European Union: A Legal Perspective', (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 487, at 497 and 500.
90. P. Manent, Débat avec J.-M. Ferry, 'Les Etats-Nations sont-ils solubles dans l'Europe?', (2006) 4 Philosophie Magazine 8, at 10.
91. cf the realistic pessimism of W. Laqueur, Die letzten Tage von Europa. Ein Kontinent verändert sein Gesicht (Propyläen, 2006).
92. A. Minc, Le crépuscule des petits dieux (Grasset, 2005)
93. for the inevitable element of 'bindingness' which is 'pré- ou anté-constituant', cf also J.-L. Nancy, 'L'impossible acte constituant', Le Monde, 28 June 2005, available at http://www.prospectives.info.
94. cf P. Manent, La raison des nations. Réflexions sur la démocratie en Europe (Gallimard, 2006), at 119 and 124, who rightly remarks that liberal societies constantly produce new differences and distinctions which have to be interiorised by individuals.
95. B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (Allen and Unwin, 1962), at 24
96. D. Rodrik, Has Globalisation Gone too Far? (Institute for International Economics, 1997), at 70.
97. A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen (Shrkamp, 2006), at 36
98. cf also F. Snyder, 'Europeanisation and Globalisation as Friends and Rivals: European Union Law in Global Economic Networks', in F. Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart, 2000), at 293
99. F. Snyder, 'Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law', (1999) 5 European Law Journal 334.
100. W. W. Powell, 'The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century. Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprises', in DiMaggio, op cit n 53 supra, 37, at 41 and 67.
101. U. Di Fabio, Das Recht offener Staaten (Mohr, 1998)
102. U. Di Fabio, Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft (Mohr, 2001).
103. O. Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought', (2004) 89 Michigan Law Review 262, at 305.
104. Sabel and Zeitlin, op cit n 42 supra, at 19.
105. This is also the approach which prevails in the white book of the EC-Commission; cf also the critique in the EUI comments on the White Paper on Governance: C. Joerges, Y Mény and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance (Harvard Law School, 2001)
106. too: Whereas in the past some bold decisions (direct effect, etc) have contributed to the permeability of Member States in the EC, it tends more and more to overstretch its role by blindly opting for more and more harmonisation of the legal systems without bearing in mind that what was productive yesterday may be destructive today once a certain level of harmonisation is already established. The deep intervention of the court jurisprudence into even more fundamental principles of Member States law creates more and more perverse effects because the ECJ definitely cannot manage the complexity of decisions whose effect within the infrastructure, eg of civil law or of general administrative law, it cannot observe in a meaningful way. Cf C. Schmid, The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court (Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, DP 4/2006), at 24 et seq, who rightly complains about the court's negligence of the general national legal context into which a European directive is necessarily embedded. The court behaves like a super court which imposes the uniform logic of hierarchy in a legal environment whose complexity asks for a cooperative legal approach.
107. Cf K. H. Ladeur, 'Methodology and European Law - Can Methodology Change so as to Cope with the Multiplicity of the Law?', in M. Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart, 2004), 91 et seq.
108. cf M. Kumm, 'Constitutionalism and Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 503.
109. cf the quite convincing polemic of G. Davies, 'Subsidiarity. The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 63, at 76.
110. Habermas, op cit n 1 supra
111. cf also Manent, op cit n 56 supra.
112. This explains also the failure of the Constitutional Treaty especially in France: The referendum did not just express a verdict on unpopular political leaders; the vote was mainly shaped by socialists and in particular unskilled and low-waged employees: M. Qvortrup, 'The Three Referendums on the European Constitution Treaty', (2006) 77 The Political Quarterly 89, at 96.
113. Only one third of the citizens of the Member States would opt in favour of a transfer of welfare policy to the European Union: S. Mau, 'Wohlfahrtspolitischer Verantwortungstransfer nach Europa?', (2003) 31 Zeitschrift für Soziologie 302, at 311
114. T. Boeri and S. Baldi, 'Europe(s) sociales, convergence et compétition', (2005) 115 Revue d'Economie Politique 705 - it should be interesting to know whether these are the citizens who are less dependent on the welfare state; in any case people know that the EC is much less dependent on direct political pressures.
115. cf only Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra, at 8 et seq; for a critique see L. Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (Penguin, 2000)
116. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op cit n 1 supra; Moravcsik, 'What can we Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?', op cit n 1 supra.
117. For a direct social responsibility of the EU, cf Schmitter, op cit n 1 supra
118. Ph. C. Schmitter and M. W. Bauer, 'A (Modest) Proposal for Expanding Social Citizenship in the European Union', (2001) 11 European Journal of Social Policy 55, who propose a right to social assistance for everybody
119. see generally H. Obinger, S. Leibfried and F. G. Castles, 'Beipässe für ein "Soziales Europa"', (2005) 44 Der Staat 505, at 538.
120. For the meaning of the concept of 'governance', cf C. Möllers, 'European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 313, at 314.
121. cf Lobel, op cit n 64 supra, at 305.
122. G. De Búrca and O. Gerstenberg, 'The De-nationalisation of Constitutional Law', (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 242, at 262.
123. For this interrelationship in international law, see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 524 et seq.
124. Dotan, op cit n 7 supra, at 293.
125. N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Harvester, 1978).
126. M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 30.
127. cf Teubner, op cit n 45 supra.
128. cf generally A. Stone Sweet, 'Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community', in A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 2000), 305, at 306 and 308
129. A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004).
130. Koskenniemi, op cit n 77 supra, at 609.
131. Schmitter, op cit n 1 supra
132. Schmitter and Bauer, op cit n 73 supra, who propose a right to social assistance to everybody
133. for a critique see Moravcsik, 'What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?', op cit n 1 supra, at 228 et seq and 231.
134. cf De Búrca and Gerstenberg, op cit n 76 supra, at 243 and 259.
135. For the Danish welfare system cf J. Torfing, 'Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime: Path-Dependency in Danish Welfare State Reform', (1999) 28 Economy and Society 3.
136. Sassen, op cit n 44 supra, at 79.
137. In the Scandinavian countries (Denmark 90%) the reluctance to claim social assistance 'eventually' without also meeting legal requirements is considerably higher than in countries like Germany (60%) and France (40%) - not to mention other countries: Y. Algan and P. Cahu, Civic Attitudes and the Design of Labor Market Institutions (CEPREMAP- WP 2005), at 14.
138. Schmitter's and Bauer's proposal to guarantee every citizen of the Union one-third of the average income in the EU as minimum financial assistance (op cit n 73 supra) starts from the illusion that poverty is an objective category and that 'solidarity' can be created by a political decision.
139. Both Sweden and Denmark have strong neo-nazi viz xenophobic movements in spite of their rather well-ordered welfare system; the same is true for Norway which also has the strongest xenophobic party in Europe - only Finland is different but it has almost no non-European immigrants.
140. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No 289, 12 December 2006, at 15.
141. M. Granovetter, 'The Strength of Weak Ties. A Network Theory Revisited', (1983) 1 Sociological Theory 201, at 224 et seq.
142. See the Maastricht Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE (Reports) 89, at 155
143. Nettesheim, op cit n 1 supra, at 7.
144. cf also K. H. Ladeur, 'Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality: The Viability of the Network Concept', (1997) 3 European Law Journal 33.
145. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op cit n 1 supra, at 8.
146. C. J. Dahlman, J. Routti and P. Ylä-Anttila (eds), Finland as a 'Knowledge Society'. Elements of a Success and Lessons Learned, Working Paper of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (2005).
147. A. Moracsik, 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the EU', (2002) 21 Journal of Common Market Studies 603
148. for a realistic look at democracy in Member States, cf also K. H. Ladeur, 'Globalisation and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks', in K. H. Ladeur (ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalisation (Ashgate, 2004), at 89.
149. Finland's success is also due to close coordination of private and public actors, cf Dahlman, Routti and Ylä-Anttila op cit n 96 supra, at 9, which in many other countries would not be regarded as 'democratic'.
150. C. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2003)
151. C. Kukathas, 'The Cultural Contradictions of Socialism', (2003) 20 Social Philosophy and Policy 18
152. F. Moreau, 'The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics', (2004) 28 Cambridge Journal of Economics 847.
153. M. C. Dorf and C. F. Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism', (1998) Columbia Law Review 267.
154. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999), at 98.
155. S. Breuer, Der Staat (Rowohlt, 1998), at 289.
156. Ladeur, op cit n 97 supra.
157. For the weakness of the 'très grand Etat', see J. J. Rosa, L'erreur européenne (Grasset, 1998)
158. J. J. Rosa, Le second XXe siècle (Grasset, 2000).
159. Sassen, op cit n 44 supra, at 233 and 280.
160. Di Fabio, Das Recht offener Staaten, op cit n 63 supra
161. Di Fabio, Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft, op cit n 63 supra.
162. cf S. Deakin, 'Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 455
163. P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 534.
164. cf Sabel and Zeitlin, op cit n 42 supra, at 2
165. for an analysis of the search for 'best practices', cf D. Zaring, 'Best Practices', (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 294, at 298.
166. For the rise of regionalism, see K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies (Free Press, 1995).
167. cf K. H. Ladeur, 'Risiko Sozialstaat', (2007) 46 Der Staat 61.
168. cf Sabel and Zeitlin, op cit n 43 supra, at 23
169. Lobel, op cit n 64 supra, at 313
170. E. Szyszczak, 'Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 486.
171. cf A. Afonso, L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi, Public Sector Efficiency: An International Comparison (WP 242, ECB, July 2003), at 22 et seq
172. for the evaluation of public education cf J. P. Greene, Education Myths (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
173. cf generally J. A. Caporaso and J.Willenbrinck, 'The New Modes of Governance and Political Authority in Europe', (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 471.
174. cf for this concept in science I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, La nouvelle alliance (Gallimard, 1979).
175. DiMaggio, op cit n 53 supra, at 210 and 212.
176. P. M. Senge and G. Carstedt, 'Innoverting our Behaviour to the Next Industrial Revolution', (2001) 42 Sloan Management Review 24, at 39.
177. E. Ostrom, 'Coping with Tragedies of the Commons', (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 493.
178. cf the interesting remarks ofU.K. Preuß, Auf der Suche nach Europas Verfassung, Transit No 17 (1999), at 1, who stresses the heterogeneity of European regimes and its conflict with state-based hierarchical order.
179. L. Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Cornell University Press, 1998).
180. Sabel and Zeitlin, op cit n 43 supra, at 38.