Consumer optimism and price discrimination

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 459-497

  Eliaz, Kfir ^a   Spiegler, Ran ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contracts; Mechanism design; Non common priors; Optimism; Screening; Speculative trade; Three part tariffs

Indexed keywords

EID: 64149110128     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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