Optimal speculative trade among large traders

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 45-74

  Eliaz, Kfir ^a   Spiegler, Ran ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Heterogeneous beliefs; Mechanism design; Partnership dissolution; Speculative trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 43349091040     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0040-0     Document Type: Article

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