The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints

Economics Letters

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 84-86

  Konrad, Kai A ^a,b,c   Kovenock, Dan ^d  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPETITION AND TAX LAW   (Germany)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^c FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliance formation puzzle; Budget constraints; Military conflict

Indexed keywords

EID: 64149088924     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.030     Document Type: Article

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