The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 79-93

  Holcomb, James H ^a   Nelson, Paul S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040060190     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(97)90053-6     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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