In support of trigger strategies: Experimental evidence from two-person noncooperative games

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 685-716

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Phillips, Owen R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036026760     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864002320757307     Document Type: Article

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