Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 9, 2008, Pages 1610-1623

  Pekeč, Aleksandar Saša ^a   Tsetlin, Ilia ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INSEAD   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Auctions; Demand uncertainty; Discriminatory pricing; Stochastic number of bidders; Uniform pricing

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; DISCRIMINATORY PRICING; STOCHASTIC NUMBER OF BIDDERS; UNIFORM PRICING;

COMMERCE; COSTS; RANDOM PROCESSES; STOCHASTIC MODELS;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 61349131272     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0882     Document Type: Article

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