Chapter 5 The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 227-369

  Mercier Ythier, Jean ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE LORRAINE   (France)

Author keywords

altruism; distributive efficiency; gift giving; liberal social contract; neutrality

Indexed keywords

EID: 60049101068     PISSN: 15740714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01005-0     Document Type: Review

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