Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 357-379

  Brunner, Johann K ^a   Falkinger, Josef ^b  

^a JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF REGENSBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Neutrality of taxes; Private provision; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040760686     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050042     Document Type: Article

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