Stable provision vs. Cournot-nash equilibria in pure public good economies

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 219-224

  Shitovitz, Benyamin ^a   Spiegel, Menahem ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649349922     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00063     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. CHAMPSAUR, P. (1975) How to share the cost of a public good? International Journal of Game Theory 4, 113-129.
2. DEMANGE, G. (1987) Nonmanipulable cores, Econometrica 55, 1057-1074.
3. FOLEY, D. K. (1970) Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods, Econometrica 38, 66-72.
4. FUDENBERG, D., and J. TIROLE (1991) Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. MAS-COLELL, A., M. D. WHINSTON, and J. G. GREEN (1995) Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
6. PELEG, B. (1986) A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, Mathematical Social Sciences 11, 83-87.
7. SHITOVITZ, B., and M. SPIEGEL (1998) Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies, Journal of Economic Theory 83, 1-18.
8. VON NEUMANN, J., and O. MORGENSTERN (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.