Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China

Management and Organization Review

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 19-53

  Nee, Victor ^a   Opper, Sonja ^b   Wong, Sonia ^c  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^c LINGNAN UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

fiscal federalism; KEYWORDS firm performance; market transition; politicized capitalism; soft budget constraint; state firm relations

Indexed keywords

EID: 43349092693     PISSN: 17408776     EISSN: 17408784     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00061.x     Document Type: Article

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