Motives for martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the spread of suicide attacks

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 46-78

  Moghadam, Assaf ^a  

^a Army Cyber Institute   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 59249092930     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.46     Document Type: Article

References (130)

1. I use the terms "suicide missions," "suicide attacks," and "suicide operations" interchangeably. The term "suicide missions" is drawn from Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
2. Only a small number of suicide attacks occurred in some of these countries before the turn of the millennium. In Pakistan there were just three such attacks. On November 19, 1995, a truck bomb rocked the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. On December 21,1995, a car bomb exploded in a crowded street in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan, killing at least 30 and wounding more than 100; and on April 29,1996, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a passenger-filled bus returning from a religious festival in Punjab, killing 52. A handful of attacks occurred in 2000 and 2002, but suicide attacks in Pakistan were widely adopted only after 2003.
3. Although the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, were not a suicide mission, seven of the suspects detonated themselves weeks later in the Madrid suburb of Leganes, as Spanish special forces were about to storm their apartment. See Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, "Maghreb Immigrants Becoming Suicide Terrorists: A Case Study on Religious Radicalization Processes in Spain," in Amy Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 179-198.
4. See Assaf Moghadam, "The New Martyrs Go Global," Boston Globe, November 18, 2005.
5. Some exceptions exist. Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber highlight the role of al-Qaida in internationalizing suicide attacks, but they do not emphasize the role of Salafi jihadist ideology. Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, "Al-Qaida and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism," Jaffee Center Memorandum, No. 78 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2005).
6. Mohammed M. Hafez discusses the appeal of Salafi jihadist ideology, but he limits his analysis to the case of Iraq. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
7. Bruce Hoffman, citing data from the RAND Terrorism Incident Database, said that 78 percent of all suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after September 11,2001, adding that 31 out of the 35 groups employing this tactic were Islamic. He did not, however, specifically refer to jihadist groups, nor did he argue that these groups were ideologically motivated. Hoffman, email correspondence with author, December 27, 2005. Scott Atran points out that "most suicide terrorists today are inspired by a global Jihadism," but he does not provide empirical support for his claim. See Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 139.
8. In an earlier study, I, too, suggested that contemporary patterns of suicide attacks are dominated by Salafi jihadists without offering any empirical data. See Assaf Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of 'Dying to Win,'" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 8 (December 2006), pp. 707-729.
9. Suicide attacks and their precursors have existed since biblical times. Prior to 1981, however, these attacks were not generally considered acts of terrorism. The modern phenomenon of suicide terrorism began in Lebanon with the December 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy. For an overview of modern-day suicide attacks and their historical precursors, see "Introduction," in Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
10. The data set relies heavily on two sources. The first is the Suicide Terrorism Database collected by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa in Israel. For a version of the database that includes 1,165 suicide attacks conducted until April 17, 2006, see http://www.laits.utexas. edu/tiger/terrorism-data/suicide-attacks-worldwide/.
11. For data since April 18, 2006, as well as for all data related to suicide attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, I used the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System. The NCTC database is available at www.nctc.gov. After combining these two databases, eliminating duplicates, and. updating the resulting database with additional information, I arrived at a data set with a total of 1,857 suicide attacks recorded from December 1981 to March 2008. For a copy of the data set, please contact me at assafm@hotmail.com.
12. One hundred nine attacks were recorded in the first quarter of 2008.
13. The 1996 figure includes a suicide car bombing on January 31,1996, by a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in which 19 people died and an estimated 1,400 people were wounded. The 1998 figure includes the August 7, 1998, suicide bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which killed 213 people and wounded an estimated 4,000.
14. These other countries are Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, China, Croatia, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Moldova, Morocco, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
15. See, for example, Joan Lachkar, "The Psychological Make-up of a Suicide Bomber," Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 349-367;
16. David Lester, Bijou Yang, and Mark Lindsay, "Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 4 (July-August 2004), pp. 283-295;
17. Eyad Sarraj and Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need of Hope," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 71-76;
18. and Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007).
19. Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign Policy, No. 120 (September/ October 2000), pp. 67-73;
20. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005);
21. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005);
22. and Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).
23. Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," in Pedahzur, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, pp. 81-107;
24. and Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq.
25. See, for example, Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger, and Leonard Weinberg, "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," Deviant Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 2003), pp. 405-423.
26. Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics"; Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 65-92;
27. Bloom, Dying to Kill;
28. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism;
29. and Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. Mccormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 4 July 2004), pp. 243-281.
30. Clark R. McCauley and M.E. Segal, "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups," in Clyde A. Hendrick, ed., Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Revieiv of Personality and Social Psychology (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987).
31. Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1 (February 2005), pp. 3-42.
32. According to some researchers, suicide attackers tend to act out of a deep sense of commitment to a larger cause, to their social network, or to a terrorist organization. See, for example, Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, pp. 126-134.
33. A suicide attacker may acquire a thirst for revenge after the death of a family member or friend, which can be reinforced by a perceived sense of humiliation. For an application of humiliation - revenge theory, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
34. Several authors have stressed the expectation of posthumous benefits as a motive for suicide attackers, particularly when the perpetrators of the attacks are Muslims. Such benefits can include the suicide attacker's elevated social status after death, rewards for the family, as well as the attainment of heavenly pleasures in the afterlife.
35. Personal crisis appears to be a particularly common motivation among women suicide bombers such as the Chechen Black Widows. Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimize and. Victims," Violence and Victims, Vol. 20, No. 6 (December 2005), pp. 603-623.
36. Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 465-489;
37. and Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 1988).
38. On the organizational goals of survival and maintenance, see James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973);
39. and Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism."
40. Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 61-88;
41. and Bloom, Dying to Kill.
42. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 61.
43. See Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom."
44. Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada," Social Forces, Vol. 84, No. 4 (June 2006), pp. 1969-1986.
45. Although this is a key feature of all terrorist attacks, suicide attacks further demonstrate the inefficacy of the targeted government, given in part the demoralization of the public and of law enforcement agencies. In addition, the effect of a suicide attack can be particularly traumatizing and long-lasting. See, for example, Keith B. Richburg, "Suicide Bomb Survivors Face Worlds Blown Apart," Washington Post, January 31, 2004;
46. and Amos Harel, "Suicide Attacks Frighten Israelis More Than Scuds," Haaretz, February 13, 2003.
47. Suicide attacks often lead to a sense of moral superiority of the groups' members over their adversaries, which may result in a group's perception that it will eventually prevail over its enemies. See Adam Dolnik, "Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism., Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 17-35.
48. See, for example, Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics";
49. and. Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," in International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), ed., Countering Suicide Terrorism (Herzliyya, Israel: ICT, 2001), pp. 140-154.
50. A notable exception to these limitations is found in recent research conducted by Michael Horowitz, who employs adoption capacity theory to argue that groups with higher levels of organizational capital are more likely to adopt suicide terrorism than groups with lower levels of capital. See Michael Horowitz, "Non-State Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Bombing," unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, July 2008.
51. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
52. See Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom," pp. 707-729.
53. See, for example, Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism on the Internet: The Neiv Arena, The New Challenges (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), pp. 64-75;
54. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 109-123;
55. and Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom, chap. 4.
56. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 23.
57. Ibid., p. 46.
58. For a more extensive critique of Pape's book Dying to Win
59. see Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom."
60. In February 2006, for example, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte confirmed that "extreme Sunni jihadist elements, a subset of which are foreign fighters, constitute a small minority of the overall insurgency, but their use of high-profile suicide attacks gives them a disproportionate impact." See Negroponte, "Statement by the Director of National Intelligence to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 2, 2006. As recently as May 2007, for instance
61. Gen. David Petraeus stated that "80 to 90 percent of the suicide bombers come from outside Iraq." Quoted in Joshua Partlow, "An Uphill Battle to Stop Fighters at Border," Washington Post, May 5, 2007.
62. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 104.
63. Osama bin Laden, "Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad against Americans," Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), February 23,1998
64. quoted in Christopher M. Blanchard, "Al-Qaida: Statements and Evolving Ideology," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 16, 2004), Order Code RS21973, p. 3.
65. Osama bin Laden, speech broadcast on Al-Jazeera satellite channel television, November 3, 2001. Quoted in "Bin Laden Rails against Crusaders and UN," BBC News, November 3, 2001.
66. "Statement by Usama bin Ladin," Waqiaah, October 26, 2002
67. quoted in Anonymous [Michael Scheuerl, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004), p. 154.
68. Pape, Dying to Win, p. 46.
69. Ibid., p. 16.
70. Ibid., p. 17.
71. Of the 1,020 suicide attacks in Iraq recorded in the data set, 208 were claimed by Salafi jihadist groups. The next most popular were nationalist-separatist groups, with 11 claimed attacks. Al-though the perpetrators of 794 attacks in Iraq are still unknown, anecdotal accounts suggest that the overwhelming number of all suicide attacks in Iraq are conducted by Salafi jihadist groups. See, for example, Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq; and International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," Middle East Report, No. 50 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 15, 2006).
72. Bloom, Dying to Kill, p. 78.
73. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing."
74. See assessment by Ely Karmon, quoted in Christopher Dickey et al., "Inside Suicide, Inc.," Netvsweek, April 15, 2002, p. 26.
75. Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), pp. 30-47.
76. Bloom apparently recognizes this problem and does not argue that outbidding has been a factor in the adoption of suicide attacks by the LTTE. See Bloom, Dying to Kill, p. 71.
77. Ibid., p. 67.
78. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: LB. Tauris, 2004), p. 290.
79. Marc Sageman, "Global Salafi Jihad," statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 9, 2003;
80. and Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
81. Reuven Paz, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2006.
82. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007), p. 125.
83. The group al-Jihad is also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Some authors dispute that al-Jihad was responsible for the attempt on al-Alfi's life and blame the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya instead.
84. Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 142-143.
85. Quoted in Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 248-249.
86. "Bin Laden's Fatwa," PBS Online Newshour, August 8,1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/in terna tional/fatwa-1996.html.
87. C.J. Chivers and David Rhode, "Turning Out Guerrillas and Terrorists to Wage a Holy War," New York Times, March 18, 2002.
88. Quoted in Blanchard, "Al-Qaida: Statements and Evolving Ideology," p. 10.
89. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet's Banner (London: Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2001), part 11. The book was serialized in the London-based magazine Al-Slmrq al-Awsat between December 2 and December 10, 2001, and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), FBISNES-2001-1202.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Wahhabism is a puritanical strand of Islam closely related to Salafism, which is common in Saudi Arabia.
93. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May 2006), pp. 207-239.
94. Cited in Reuven Paz, "Qa'idat AI-Jihad: A New Name on the Road to Palestine" (International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, May 7, 2002), http://www.gIobal-report.co.il/prism/?1+en&a+4959.
95. On women, see, for example, Sebastian Rotella, "European Women Join Ranks of Jihadis," Los Angeles Times, January 10,2006;
96. and Katharina von Knop, "The Female Jihad: Al-Qaida's Women," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 2007), pp. 397-414.
97. See, for example, Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002);
98. and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
99. Kathryn Haahr, "Emerging Terrorist Trends in Spain's Moroccan Communities," Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 9 (May 4, 2006), pp. 1-2;
100. Pascale Combelles Siegel, "Radical Islam and the French Muslim Prison Population," Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 15 (July 27, 2006), pp. 1-2;
101. and Lorenzo Vidino, "The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia," Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 20 (October 19, 2006), pp. 5-6.
102. On the Middle East, see, for example, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Netivorks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
103. See, for example, Anar Valiyev, "The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan," Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 13 (July 1, 2005), pp. 6-7.
104. See International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," Asia Report, No. 83 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 13, 2004).
105. Douglas Farah, "Salafists, China, and West Africa's Growing Anarchy" (Alexandria, Va.: International Assessment and Strategy Center, December 7, 2004).
106. An example would be the group al-Qaida in Iraq.
107. This assessment is based on the best judgment of a group of eight terrorism experts at the RAND Corporation. See Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather Gregg, Theodore W. Krasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau, Beyond Al-Qaeda, Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement, and Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006).
108. This excludes groups such as Hamas, which engages primarily in violence against Israel, a non-Muslim state, but has generally avoided systematic attacks against the Palestinian Authority (prior to Hamas's electoral victory in 2006) for fear of sparking a civil war.
109. Takfir is not generally practiced by mainstream Islamist groups and not even by all Salafi jihadists. Those groups and individuals who do practice this form of excommunication, however, are exclusively Salafi jihadist.
110. See International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words"; and Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq.
111. Attacks by unknown groups, whose ideology could, not be ascertained, are omitted from this table.
112. According to other databases, Shiite groups such as Hezbollah and Amal conducted fewer attacks in Lebanon than secular or Sunni groups. See, for example, Pape, Dying to Win. Indeed, the identity of many groups that conducted, suicide attacks in Lebanon during the 1980s were not identified in the data set used here. It is therefore possible that Shiite groups may not have been the dominant perpetrators of suicide attacks during the 1980s.
113. Yoram Schweitzer, email communication with author, November 19, 2006.
114. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, pp. 167-168.
115. They were Asif Mohammed Hanif, a 21-year-old student from West London who blew himself up at the Mike's Place bar in Tel Aviv on April 30, 2003; and 27-year-old Omar Khan Sharif, a married resident of Derby, England. Sharif also intended to perpetrate a suicide bombing at Mike's Place along with Hanif, but Sharif's explosive device failed to detonate. He fled the scene and later drowned in the Mediterranean. His body washed ashore on the Tel Aviv beach front on May 12, 2003.
116. Michael Roberts, email communication with author, November 20, 2006; and Stephen Hopgood, email communication with author, November 24, 2006.
117. Hopgood, email communication with author.
118. Hezbollah is believed to have staged two attacks in Argentina: the March 17,1992, suicide car bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people and. injured more than 250; and the July 18, 1994, suicide car bombing of the Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires, which killed more than 80 people and wounded some 300.
119. Roberts, email communication with author; and Hopgood, email communication with author.
120. Hopgood, email communication with author.
121. Steven Lee Myers, "A Nation at War: Suicide Strike; With Bombing, Iraqis Escalate Guerrilla Tactics and Show New Danger on Front Lines," New York Times, March 30, 2003.
122. According to a Department of Defense news briefing with Col. Sean MacFarland, commander of the First Brigade Combat Team, First Armored Division stationed in Ramadi, Iraq, "[Foreign fighters] are very few in number, although as far as we can tell, they constitute about 100 percent of the suicide bombers." Quoted in Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, eds., "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, November 13, 2006, updated October 1, 2007), p. 18.
123. See also comments by Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who stated on December 1, 2005, that "at least 96 percent of suicide bombers [in Iraqi are not Iraqis." Quoted in Chris Tomlinson, "U.S. General: Suicide and Car Bomb Attacks Down in Iraq," Associated Press, December 1, 2005.
124. On Afghanistan, a recent report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, for instance, suggests that there is little doubt that some perpetrators in Afghanistan crossed the border from Pakistan, although at least some are Afghan refugees. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007)" (New York: UNAMA, 2007).
125. Craig Whitlock, "Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach," Washington Post, November 13, 2005.
126. A theoretical division of suicide attacks into two patterns also helps contextualize the outbidding thesis. That explanation may account for the adoption of suicide attacks in some cases, but is less capable of accounting for cases of globalized suicide missions. The perpetrators of the London bombings of July 2005, for example, hardly vied for the sympathies of the domestic population-on the contrary, they detested the local population to such an extent that they blew themselves up in its midst. The outbidding thesis is therefore less relevant to our understanding of globalized suicide missions because the importance of killing "infidels" seems to supersede organizational rivalries.
127. On the importance of small group dynamics, see Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks;
128. and Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq.
129. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey" (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007), p. 3.
130. Quoted in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), "Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi: Collateral Killing of Muslims is Legitimate," Special Dispatch Series, No. 917 (Washington, D.C.: Jihad and Terrorism Project, MEMRI, June 7, 2005).