Suicide terrorism, occupation, and the globalization of martyrdom: A critique of Dying to Win

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 8, 2006, Pages 707-729

  Moghadam, Assaf ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750300544     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600561907     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference (Herzliyya, Israel: ICT, 2001).
2. Joyce M. Davis Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2003);
3. Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of IslamicMartyrology (New York: Frank Cass, 2003);
4. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside theWorld of PalestinianWomen Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2003);
5. Christoph Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004);
6. Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004);
7. Ergün Capan, ed., An Islamic Perspective: Terror and Suicide Attacks (Somerset, NJ: The Light, 2004);
8. Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyr's Square (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);
9. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, trans. David Macey (London: Pluto Press, 2005);
10. Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005);
11. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005);
12. and Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (London: Polity, 2005).
13. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.
14. Since the publication of Dying to Win, a larger dataset of suicide attacks has been published in the appendix of Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
15. See, for example, Alan Krueger and JitkaMaleckova, "Education, Poverty, PoliticalViolence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,quot; NBER Working Paper No. 9074, July 2002;
16. James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages,"! Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2005;
17. and Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," NBER Working Paper No. w10859, October 2004.
18. A. Moghadam, "The New Martyrs Go Global," Boston Globe, 18 November 2005.
19. This author strongly disagrees with the notion that suicide terrorism is significantly different from terrorism in general and concurs instead with Martha Crenshaw, who argues that "although the tactic [of suicide terrorism] may present itself as unique and innovative, it is a combination of familiar methods, targets, and motives. Thus suicide terrorism should be interpreted as a particular case of oppositional terrorism rather than as a sui generis phenomenon. It shares many of the properties of general terrorism." Martha Crenshaw, "'Suicide' Terrorism in Comparative Perspective," in International Policy Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference, 21.
20. Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97.3 (August 2003).
21. Pape, Dying to Win, 281, fn 15.
22. A partial list of such works includes Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign Policy (September/October 2000);
23. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(2) (February/March 2003);
24. Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299 (7 March 2003), 1534-1539;
25. Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(4) (July/ August 2004);
26. and Mia M. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
27. Martin Kramer, "TheMoral Logic of Hizballah," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 131-160.
28. Martin Kramer, "Political Science Targets Suicide Terrorism: Bystanders: Take Cover!," available on the website of Martin Kramer (http://www.martinkramer.org/pages/899526/index.htm), last accessed 5 November 2005.
29. Ariel Merari, "The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, 192-207.
30. See, for example, Ariel Merari, "Suicide Terrorism," in Robert I.Yufit andDavid Lester, eds., Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Suicidal Behavior (New York:WIley, 2004), 431-454.
31. See also Assaf Moghadam, "Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism," Fletcher Ledger, 4 February 2002. Available at (http://www.fletcherledger.com/archive/2002-02-04/ 020402-NfinalSuicideTerrorism.htm).
32. Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism, 25-42.
33. Allison Smith, "Summary of Research Conducted on Suicide Terrorism," Science & Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Available at (http://www.nijpcs.org/terror/ Smith%20Table.pdf, last accessed 5 November 2005).
34. This section is based in part on Assaf Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," in Ami Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (London: Routledge, 2006).
35. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, and not all definitions of terrorism define an act of terrorism as an attack on noncombatants or civilians. Some of the more frequently cited definitions, however, do. The U.S. State Department, for example, defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Noncombatants include both civilians as well as military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/ornot on duty.
36. See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, xii. Available at (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31880.htm), last accessed 14 December 2004. The full report is available at (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/). For a definition of terrorism that does not include a reference to noncombatants,
37. see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43.
38. On how Pape labels his collection of data a collection of suicide "terrorist" attacks, see Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win, 39. Pape, for example, includes the 27 February 2002 suicide attack against an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) checkpoint as a suicide attack; a 11 June 2000 attack by Chechen separatists at a military post in Grozny; the 13 November 1995 attack by Al Qaeda at a U.S. military base in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and a 19 March 1991 suicide truck bomb by the LTTE at a Sri Lankan army camp, to name a few. See the book's appendix, 253-263.
39. Pape's description of the LTTE as a secular organization is itself problematic. As a recent study on the group concludes, the LTTE mobilizes "both the Hindu majority and a significant Christian minority within the Sri Lankan Tamil population via modalities that are deeply rooted in the lifestyles and religious practices of Tamils in India and Lanka." See Michael Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs': Regenerating Divine Potency?" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28(6) (November/December 2005). On the point that LTTE has characteristics that are more in common with a religious cult than a stereotypical nationalist group like the IRA or ETA, see also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (revised and expanded edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Chapter 5.
40. The distinctions are apparent from Pape's description of the targets of suicide attacks in the data found in the book's appendix.
41. In fact, a more updated database on suicide terrorism compiled by Ami Pedahzur confirms that Hamas attacks civilian targets much more frequently than does the LTTE. Whereas Hamas, for instance, has launched 74 percent of its attacks against civilians, the LTTE has targeted civilians in only 28 percent of its attacks. See Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 19.
42. For a general discussion of problems in defining suicide terrorism, see Assaf Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism."
43. See, for example, Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics," in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, 78;
44. Martha Crenshaw, "'Suicide' Terrorism in Comparative Perspective," in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, 21;
45. and Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," in ICT, Countering Suicide Terrorism, 140.
46. Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics," 78.
47. Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," 140.
48. Pape does not cite these established definitions of suicide attacks, which were first espoused byYoram Schweitzer, BoazGanor, and Martha Crenshaw, but adopts them nevertheless as the "classic definition." See Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win, 10-11.
49. Robert A. Pape,Dying toWin, 253-263. For a more complete database that lists simultaneousattacks as multiple attacks,
50. see the appendix in Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 241-253.
51. This notation is adopted, for example, by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, a comprehensive, publicly available databank of global terrorist incidents and organizations. Available at http://www.tkb.org
52. The actual number of attacks has been obtained from the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) of the NationalMemorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), which integrates data from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases; the Terrorism Indictment database; and DFI Internationals research on terrorist rganizations. The database is available at (http://www.tkb.org/). In the recount of Al Qaeda attacks, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole has been counted as one attack even though two terrorists were identified on the boat that rammed the U.S.S. Cole, because the explosives-laden boat constituted effectively a single explosive device.
53. Incidents are what Pape calls "attacks."
54. In the recount of Al Qaeda attacks, I count the attack on the U.S.S. Cole as one attack even though two terrorist were identified on the boat that rammed the U.S.S. Cole, because the explosive-laden boat constituted effectively a single explosive device.
55. Based on the numbers supplied in Pape's database, the average number of attacks per incident for Al Qaeda is 1.85. For the LTTE, it is 1.88, and thus slightly higher.
56. For a list of the ongoing campaigns, see Pape, Dying to Win, 258-263.
57. The average length of the 13 campaigns that were completed at the time of Pape's writing, and which he includes in his count of the success of terrorism, is 15 months. By contrast, the average length of the 5 campaigns that were ongoing at the time of Pape's writing is 44 months, nearly 3 times as long as the average length of the completed campaigns.
58. The average length of completed campaigns is 15 months. The length of four out of the five ongoing campaigns (Campaigns #14, 15, 16, and 17) is significantly higher than the 15 months average length of completed campaigns, namely between 37 and 98 months. This part will thus include these four campaigns in my count, omitting ongoing Campaign #18 (Iraqi Rebels vs. U.S. and its Allies) from my own count because that campaign has gone on a mere 5 months at the time of Pape's writing - shorter than the average for completed campaigns. The author thanks Xenia Dormandy for making suggestions that have been incorporated into this section.
59. These campaigns are Campaign # 14: Al Qaeda vs. U.S. (1996-); #15: Chechen Separatists vs. Russia (2000-); #16: Kashmir Separatists vs. India (2000-); #17: Hamas/Islamic Jihad vs. Israel (2000-); and #18: Iraqi Rebels vs. U.S.
60. No change was discernible in the following 6 campaigns: #3: Lebanon vs. Israel and SLA (July 1985-June 1986); #5: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka (April 1995-October 2000); # 8: BKI vs. India (August 1995); # 9: Hamas vs. Israel (February-March 1996); #11: PKK vs. Turkey (June-October 1996); and #12: PKK vs. Turkey (March-August 1999).
61. These seven campaigns are #1: Hezbollah vs. US, France (April-December 1983); #2: Hezbollah vs. Israel (November 1983-April 1985); #4: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka (July 1990-November 1994); #6: Hamas vs. Israel (April 1994); #7: Hamas/Islamic Jihad vs. Israel (October 1994-August 1995); #10: Hamas vs. Israel (March-September 1997); and #13: L TTE vs. Sri Lanka (July-November 2001).
62. This campaign was waged by Hamas against Israel from March to September 1997. See Pape, Dying to Win, 40.
63. See, for example, Alan Cowell, "The Daring Attack that Blew Up in Israel's Face," New York Times, 15 October 1997, A1.
64. Ibid.
65. The only exception to this rule is in the context of prisoners' exchanges. For instance, Israel has repeatedly swapped prisoners or bodies of Hizballah fighters in return for kidnapped Israelis or their remains.
66. Benjamen. Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West CanWin (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986).
67. Alan Cowell, "The Daring Attack that Blew Up in Israel's Face," New York Times,15 October 1997, A1.
68. See, for example, Julian Ozanne, "Israel Rounds Up Hamas Supporters," Financial Times, 20 April 1994, 4.
69. See, for example, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F.Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organizations 56(2) (Spring 2002).
70. As Sheikh Yassin stated late in 1997, for instance, "the PA is implementing the Oslo agreement, which recognizes Israel's existence, and it is holding a dialogue with Israel. We rejected that agreement, and we do not recognize Israel or that dialogue"
71. See "Hamas Role in PA 'Out of the Question'," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7 December 1997, 3. Available from World News Connection, FBIS Document ID # FBIS-NES-97-343.
72. I thank Monica Toft for this point.
73. "Jane's World Armies: United States," 17 October 2005.
74. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), 274, fn 9.
75. For all 21 attacks of Al Qaeda included in Pape's database, see Pape, Dying toWin, 258-259.
76. Apart from the attack in Mombasa, attacks against Jewish targets for which Al Qaeda is responsible include the attack against a synagogue in the Tunisian town of Djerba on 11 April 2002; multiple suicide bombings on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca whose five targets included a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, a Jewish cemetery, and a Jewish community center; and the 15 November 2003 suicide attacks on two synagogues in Istanbul.
77. "Interview with Osama bin Laden," Frontline, May 1998. Available at (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/ who/interview.html), last accessed 4 November 2005.
78. Although some scholars doubt the authenticity of the letter, the U.S. government believes that the letter is accurate, and the letter has been posted on the website of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. For the original Arabic version and a translated copy of the letter, which is dated 9 July 2005, see (http://www.dni.gov/ release_letter_101105.html), last accessed 24 November 2005.
79. Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review 97(3) (August 2003).
80. "Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans," Al Quds Al Arabi (London), 23 February 1998.
81. Speech by Osama bin Laden broadcast on Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television on 3 November 2001. The date of the speech is unknown. Quoted in "Bin Laden Rails against Crusaders and UN," BBC News,3 November 2001. Available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/ media_reports/1636782.stm), last accessed 5 November 2005.
82. Statement by Usama bin Ladin," Waqiaah, 26 October 2002. Quoted in Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004),154.
83. See, for example, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 3-17.
84. "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi - October 11, 2005," available at the website of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html), last accessed 1 November 2005.
85. "Interview with Osama bin Laden," Frontline, May 1998. Available at (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/ interview.html), last accessed 4 November 2005.
86. "Website Posts Full Version of New Audiotape Attributed to Bin Ladin," FBIS Report - FEA20041227000762, 27 December 2004. Quoted in Christopher M. Blanchard, "Al Qaeda," 6, fn.20.
87. Hoffman B., Inside Terrorism, Chapter 5.
88. I thank Bruce Hoffman for this point.
89. Patrick Quin and Katherine Shrader, "Foreigners Blamed for Iraq Suicide Attacks," Washington Post, 1 July 2005.
90. Bradley Graham, "Zarqawi 'Hijacked' Insurgency: U.S. General Says Foreign Fighters Now Seen as Main Threat," Washington Post, 28 September 2005, A17.
91. Most scholars, including Pape himself, acknowledge that multiple, rather than single causes, account for the genesis of suicide terrorism. See, for example, Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," in Ami Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism.
92. American commanders in Iraq say that foreigners make up over 90 percent of the suicide bombers. See "Dexter Filkins, "Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq Come from 27, Mostly Arab, Lands," New York Times, 21 October 2005.
93. See also Reuven Paz, "Arab Volunteers in Iraq,"
94. and Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, "Saudi Militants in Iraq."
95. See Assaf Moghadam, "The New Martyrs Go Global," Boston Globe, 18 November 2005.
96. See, for example, Assaf Moghadam, Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects"
97. Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack"
98. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill; and
99. Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
100. The only exception was Asif Mohammed Hanif, a 21-year-old student from West London who exploded himself at the "Mike's Place" bar in Tel Aviv on 30 April 2003. 27-year-old Omar Khan Sharif, a married resident of the English town of Derby, also intended to perpetrate a suicide bombing at Mike's Place along with Hanif, but Sharif's explosive device failed to detonate. He fled the scene and later drowned in the Mediterranean. His body washed ashore on the Tel Aviv beach front on 12 May 2003.
101. Exceptions do exist, but are few in numbers. On 21 May 1991, for example, a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber killed Indian prime minister Rajiv Ghandi in the Indian city of Madras. Hizballah is believed to have staged two attacks in Argentina: The 17 March 1992 suicide car bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people and injured over 250; and the 18 July 1994 suicide car bombing of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, that killed over 80 people and wounded some 300.
102. Raymond Bonner, "Slow Progress in Bali Inquiry Hints at Wilier Terror Groups," New York Times, 27 October 2005.
103. See Zeev Schiff, "Islamization in Europe," Haaretz, 11 November 2005.
104. Craig Whitlock, "Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach," Washington Post, 13 November 2005, A1.
105. Carlotta Gall, "Suicide Bombers Hit Peacekeepers in Afghanistan," New York Times, 15 November 2005.
106. For details, see Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, chapters 2 and 3.
107. Ayman al-Zawahiri himself has hinted in his July 2005 letter that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization's attacks against the Shias are undermining support for Al Qaeda among Muslims. See "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi - 11 October 2005."
108. This statement is confirmed by data collected by the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa. See Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
109. See, for example, Reuven Paz, "Arab Volunteers in Iraq: An Analysis," PRISM Occasional Papers 3, 1 (March 2005)
110. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks
111. and Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, "Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom's Response," CSIS Report, 19 September, 2005.
112. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 305.
113. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, 152.
114. See Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers.
115. and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers.
116. Dan Murphy, "Iraq, Internet Fuel Growth of Global Jihad," Christian Science Monitor, 12 July 2005.
117. Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, "Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations," Washington Post, 7 August 2005, A1.
118. Jonathan Curiel, "Terror.Com," San Francisco Chronicle, 10 July 2005, A1.
119. Ibid.
120. Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, "Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations," Washington Post, 7 August 2005, A1.
121. Ibid.
122. Another important recent book that should be mentioned in this regard is Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Like Pape, Sageman bases his findings on empirical data, in Sageman's case the biographies of 172 members of what he terms the "Global Salafi Jihad" obtained from open sources.
123. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/ 11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 362.