Anatomy of the Salafi movement

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 207-239

  Wiktorowicz, Quintan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33645122188     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100500497004     Document Type: Review

References (99)

1. Opponents of Salafism frequently affix the "Wahhabi" designator to denote foreign influence. It is intended to signify followers of Abd al-Wahhab and is most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority of the Muslim community but have made recent inroads in "converting" the local population to the movement ideology. In these countries, local religious authorities have responded to the growing influence of Salafi thought by describing Salafis as Wahhabis, a term that for most non-Salafis conjures up images of Saudi Arabia. The foreign nature of the "Wahhabis" is juxtaposed to locally authentic forms of indigenous Islam. In this manner, opponents of Salafism inject nationalism into religious discourse by raising the specter of foreign influence. The Salafi movement itself, however, never uses this term. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use "Wahhabi" in their title or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as "Salafi/Wahhabi").
2. Author's interview with Salafi jihadi leader, Amman, Jordan, 1997.
3. The term "purist" is taken from International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004.
4. For background on aqida, see W. Montgomery Watt, "Akida," in Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition v. 1.0 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999).
5. For a brief summary of the Salafi aqida in particular, see Naasir al-'Aql, "Principles and Methodology for the 'Aqeedah of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah," Al-Ibaanah 2 (August 1995), pp. 25-26.
6. This even includes emulating the way the Prophet dressed, which explains the tell-tale Salafi style of wearing a loose fitting garment that reaches to the mid-calf (and not below the ankle).
7. As quoted in Jami'at Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da'wah (Ipswich, Suffolk, UK: Jami'at Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, 1993), p. 5.
8. As quoted in Jami'at Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da'wah (Ipswich, Suffolk, UK: Jami'at Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, 1993), p. 3.
9. See, for example, Saleem al-Hilali, "Who is the Victorious Group," Al-Ibaanah 2 (August 199), pp. 39-42
10. and Muhammad Ibn Jameel Zaynoo, "Methodology of the Saved Sect," Al-Ibaanah 3 (April 1996).
11. As quoted in Zaynoo, "Methodology of the Saved Sect," p. 22.
12. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst Publishers, 2004).
13. For a good overview of Islamic rationalism, see Tilman Nagel, The History of Islamic Theology (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2000).
14. For issues related to the debate between rationalists and those who argued along the lines of Salafis, see various entries in Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition v. 1.0 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999), including tawhid, iman, kalam, il al-kalam, akida, Maturidiyya, Mutazila, and Ashariyya.
15. W. Montgomery Watt, "Akida," in Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition v. 1.0 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999).
16. Abdul Aziz Bin Abdullah, Bin Baz, "The Beautiful and Lofty Attributes," Al-Ibaanah 2 (August 1995), pp. 31-33.
17. H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," in Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition v. 1.0 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999).
18. H. Laoust, "Ahmad B. Hanbal," in Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition v. 1.0 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999).
19. For the Islamic modernists, see Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
20. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
21. Mansoor Moaddell and Kamran Taltoff, ed., Contemporary Debates in Islam:" An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
22. Author's interview with jihadi Salafi, Amman, Jordan, 1997.
23. This concern still resonates, and even jihadis view rationalism as a threat. An Al Qaeda-affiliated website posted an article citing the "threat of the Rational School" in which it blamed British imperialism for planting rationalism through Muhammad Abduh. It notes that rationalism "may become the first stepping stone to secularizing the region, because it is a mixture of secularism and Islam." As quoted in Yigal Carmon, "Contemporary Islamist Ideology Permitting Genocidal Murder," paper presented at the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, MEMRI Special Report-No. 25, January 27, 2004, available at (http://www.memri.org/ bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SR2504).
24. Scholars are given a great deal of respect by their followers, so much so that more ardent Salafis complain that others are guilty of taqlid - blindly following their leader without considering the sources of Islam directly. Jihadi Salafis (and some other Islamists), for example, have argued that Sheikh Bin Baz's (former Mufti of Saudi Arabia, d. 1999) students blindly followed him in deviant understandings of Islam because of an emotional attachment and respect for the sheikh, irrespective of contrary religious evidence. Their love and admiration was seen as responsible for preventing them from looking for "the truth" (Author's interview with Omar Bakri Muhammad, a jihadi and founder of al-Muhajiroun, London, 2002).
25. Osama bin Laden, "Address to the Ummah on the Anniversary of the Crusader War Jihad," available at (www.jihadunspun.com). Accessed 1 November 2002.
26. "Respecting the Status of Scholars," Al-Asaalah Magazine, available at (www.al-manhaj.com/articles/knowledge/K1002.html). Accessed 9 October 2001.
27. International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists? ICG Middle East Report No. 31, 21 September 2004, p. 3.
28. Author's multiple interviews with Hasan Abu Haniya, who sat in the study circle, Jordan, 1996-1997.
29. Bin Baz and the radical Hamoud al-Uqla al-Shuaybi both sat with Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti. Al-Uqla also taught the current Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul Aziz Al-Alshaykh.
30. The interconnections in the educational network beg an important question for future research: What variables lead to different orientations despite a common educational experience? Why, for example, would individuals from the same study circles go on to become part of rival factions? Methodologically, a researcher could examine several scholars who have produced students that eventually rise to prominence in rival factions (Albani and his students would be a good case in point). Are there common variables that underlie the divergent trajectories? Does it relate to personal attributes? Situational factors? Exposure to particular configurations of specific scholars? Quasi-controlled experiments could help answer these questions and identify critical radicalization variables.
31. Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: Its Origins, Development, and Special Features (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 1993), pp. 31-36.
32. For a detailed explanation of the science of hadith, see M.M. Azami, Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1992).
33. This is one of the justifications (among others) used by Nasser ibn Hamed. See (http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects& Area=jihad&ID=SR2504).
34. See, for example, the controversy surrounding Yusuf Qaradawi's position on this issue, available at (http://www.memri.org/bin/ articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP79404).
35. For the extensive use of this argument, see Muhammad Farag's The Neglected Duty, as translated in The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, 1986).
36. Also see Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 7.
37. Haneef James Oliver, The 'Wahhabi' Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden, p. 21. Accessed at (http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/), November 23, 2004.
38. Accessed at (http://www.allaahuakbar.net/scholars/albaani/ debate_on_jihad.htm), 9 December 2004.
39. "Fatwaa of Imaan Ibn Baaz (D. 1420H) Concerning the Algerian Affair," pp. 2-3, posted at (www.troid.org).
40. See Article ID: CAF020011, available at (www.salafipublications.com).
41. Author's interview with Halabi, Zarqa, 2 April 1997.
42. As quoted in "Historical Development of the Methodologies of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen and Their Effect and Influence upon Contemporary Salafee Dawah," part one, p. 20, fn. 23. Available at (www.salafipublications.com).
43. Muhammad Abu Shaqra, The Truth about the Extremists (in Arabic), sound cassette, no date.
44. Roy, Globalised Islam, pp. 275-287
45. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 251-252.
46. See, for example (http://www.sahihalbukhari.com/ NDV10&articleID=NDV100009&articlePages=1). Accessed 10 December 2004.
47. On the dangers of hizbiyya, see various pieces posted at (http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/sp.cfm?secID=GRV&subsecID=GRV13 &loadpage=displaysubsection.cfm). Accessed 10 December, 2004.
48. For a good representation of these critiques, see various pieces posted at (http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/ sp.cfm?secID=GRV&subsecID=GRV07&loadpage=displaysubsection.cfm). Accessed 10 December 2004.
49. "The Speech of the Scholars upon Salmaan and Safar," part one, p. 11, posted at (www.salafipublications.com).
50. "Historical Development," ch. 5, p. 14, fn. 5.
51. Historical Development, ch. 5, p. 12.
52. For a discussion of sacred authority, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
53. International Crisis Group, "Saudi Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?" 21 September 2004, p. 2.
54. Bin Baz initially supported a petition that implied criticism of the royal family and the decision to allow U.S. forces in the kingdom, but he eventually backtracked after the Council of Senior Scholars reprimanded the cleric who had publicized the petition. See International Crisis Group, Indonesian Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004, p. 20, fn. 96.
55. Apparently, this fatwa was made a number of years before the first intifada but was only made public after the uprising.
56. Mohammed Nasir al-Din al-Albani, The Knowledge of Current Affairs, trans. by Abu Talhah Dawud Ibn Ronald Burbank (Birmingham, UK: Jam'iat Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, 1994).
57. As quoted in "The Knowledge of Current Affairs of Safar al-Hawaalee and Salmaan al-'Awdah Weighed upon the Scales," prepared by Abu Ibraaheem al-Canadee, p. 9, available at (http://www.troid.org/articles/manhaj/ innovation/qutbees/fiqhulwaaqi.pdf). Accessed 10 December 2004.
58. As quoted in "The Knowledge of Current Affairs of Safar al-Hawaalee and Salmaan al-'Awdah," p. 3.
59. As quoted at (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~islamic/ilm/manhaj/ arkh.html). Accessed 10 December 2004.
60. As quoted in "The Major Scholars Refute the Aqeedah and Manhaj of Abdur-Rahmaan Abdul-Khaaliq," p. 6, posted at (http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=NDV09&articleID= NDV090003&articlePages=1). Accessed 10 December 2004.
61. As quoted at (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~islamic/ilm/manhaj/ albanisalmankhaliq.html). Accessed 10 December 10 2004.
62. For background on Hawali and his views, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent New York: Palgrave, 1999), chapter two.
63. Assessed at (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/ fatwa_1996.html), 26 November 2004.
64. "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder," pp. 5-6.
65. For background on the CDLR, see Fandy, Saudi Arabia, ch. 4.
66. As quoted in "The Knowledge of Current Affairs of Safar al-Hawaalee and Salmaan al-'Awdah," p. 24.
67. Osama bin Laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," published in al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 8 August 1996.
68. MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series - No. 639, 7 January 2004.
69. Bin Laden, "Declaration of War."
70. Al Qaeda, "A Statement from Qa'idat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington," 24 April 2002. The original document was posted at (www.alneda.com) (hosted by Markaz al-Dirasat wal-Buhuth al-Islamiyya) and provided to the author by Paul Eedle after the website was shut down. English and Arabic are available at (http://www.mepc.org/ public_asp/journal_vol10/0306_wiktorowiczkaltner.asp).
71. MEMRI, "A New Bin Laden Speech," Special Dispatch Series, no. 539, 18 July 2003.
72. Author's interview with jihadi Salafis in Jordan, 1996-1997.
73. Osama bin Laden, "To the Islamic Ummah, On the First Anniversary of the New American Crusader War," 12 October 2002. Available at (www.jihadunspun.net).
74. Osama Bin Laden interview with Dawn, as reproduced in Rubin and Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism, p. 262.
75. Source: T. Nagel. The History of Islamic Theology: From Muhammad to the Present. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers), 2000, pp. 31-32.
76. Source: G. L. D. Vida. Kharidjites. In Encyclopedia of Islam, CD-ROM edition, v. 10 (Netherlands: Brill, 1999).
77. The early Murji'a also believed that faith did not decrease or increase, a position that contemporary Salafis continue to denounce. Because the Qur'an explicitly refers to an increase in faith, later Hanafis argued that faith could increase but never decrease. Although this may seem like an esoteric debate, it has become part of the Salafi polemics launched against liberal and moderate Muslims.
78. For the distinction, see, for example, (http://members.rogers.com/ islamfrominside/Pages/Tafsir/Tafsir(2-1to5).html).
79. For a good overview, see Shaikh Ahmad Fareed, On the Issue of Takfeer (Ipswich, UK: Jam'iat Ihyaa' Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, 1997).
80. For a good summation of the jihadi acceptance of these principles, see Abu Hamza al-Misri, The Khawaarij and Jihad (Birmingham, UK: Makhtabah al-Ansar, 2000), pp. 64-70.
81. "The Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War with the United States and its Agents," FBIS translated text, 1 August 2003. Available at (http://www.whywar.com/files/ qaeda_east_riyadh_operation.txt). Accessed 10 December 2004.
82. "The Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal."
83. Ibid.
84. For weighing the consequences, see Ali Hasan al-Halabi, Fundamentals of Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil According to Shaykh Ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyya (Cincinnati, OH: Al-Quran al-Sunnah Society of North America, 1995), pp. 18-19.
85. For a purist overview, see Article ID: MNJ090001 and Article ID: GRV070018, available at (www.salafipublications.com).
86. "The Creed of Imaan al-Albaanee on Takfir and Apostacy," p. 10 fn. 1, posted at (http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/ sp.cfm?subsecID=MSC06&articleID=MSC060006&articlePages=1). Accessed 10 December 2004.
87. See, for example, "Historical Effects."
88. "The Speech of the Scholars upon Salmaan and Safar," part one, pp. 8-9, posted at (http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/ sp.cfm?subsecID=GSC02&articleID=NDV120006&articlePages=1). Accessed 10 December 2004.
89. Albani, however, seems to have been more reserved in his use of the term "Khawarij of this era" than his purist followers, who are responsible for much of the polemics. When asked about Hawali's book on irja, Albani's exact response was, "They have opposed the Salaf in much of the issues of manhaj, and it is befitting that I label them the Khawarij of the era. And this resembles their emergence at the current time in which we read their statements - because they, in reality, their words take the direction and objective of that of the Khawarij in performing takfir of the one who commits major sins" (quoted in "The Speech of the Scholars upon Safar and Salmaan," p. 8). He went on to say that he did not know whether they argued that every major sin was apostasy. As a result, Albani did not make the label absolute, instead observing that they resemble the Khawarij in certain respects.
90. See various publications related to takfir posted at www.salafipublications.com.
91. See, for example, a fatwa from Bin Baz about rebelling against rulers, available at (http://63.175.194.25/index.php?ln=eng&ds=qa& lv=browse&QR=9911&dgn=4). Accessed 1 December 2004.
92. For example, see "The Advice of Shayul-Islaam Ibn Baz (D. 1420H) to Usaamah Ibn Laadin Al-Khaarijee," posted at (www.troid.org).
93. There is a broader context for this verse than is typically explained by the jihadis. It comes after a number of verses that refer to the Jews and Christians, and the majority of scholars believe Quran 5:44 therefore refers to Jews and Christians in particular. See Rosalind Gwynne, "Al-Qa'ida and al-Qur'an: The 'Tafsir' of Usamah bin Laden," unpublished paper, 18 September 2001, p. 1. Purists frequently argue that the jihadis misapply verses about the Jews and Christians to Muslims.
94. Hussam S. Timani, ch. 4 from unpublished manuscript, pp. 204-206.
95. See, for example, "Declaration of War."
96. "The Creed of Imaam al-Albaanee," p. 37, fn. 49.
97. See, for example, the argument laid out in al-Muhajiroun, "6 Reasons Why all the Rulers are Kafir," extract from The Shari'ah Magazine 1(13) (no date), p. 1.
98. Al-Misri, The Khawaarij and Jihad, pp. 56-57.
99. There are a few other points of debate that revolve around technical and grammatical issues, but the differences are mostly related to interpretations about intention.