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Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 57-73

Conflicting objectives within the board: Evidence from overlapping audit and compensation committee members

Author keywords

Audit Committee; CEO compensation; Committee separation; Compensation Committee; Financial reporting quality

Indexed keywords


EID: 58849155519     PISSN: 09262644     EISSN: 15729907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-008-9125-y     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (36)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.