In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 439-459

  Brogaard, Berit ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549084183     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400802001913     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Bach, K. 1997. Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 215-24
2. Bezuidenhout, A. 2003. Context-Shifting, Philosophy of Language Conference, Yale University, 7-9 November 2003
3. Bezuidenhout, A. 2005. Indexicals and Perspectivals, Facta Philosophica 7: 3-18
4. Brogaard, B. forthcoming a. Sea Battle Semantics, Philosophical Quarterly DOI 10.1111/j.1467- 9213.2007.515.x
5. Brogaard, B. forthcoming b. Attitude Ascriptions: Do You Mind the Gap?, in Philosophy Compass, ed. B. Weatherson. Topic ed. T. Gendler, DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00118.x
6. Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore 2002. Indexicality, Binding, Anaphora and A Priori Truth, Analysis 62: 271-81
7. Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore 2003. Context-Shifting Arguments, in Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics, ed. J. Hawthorne and D. Zimmerman: 25-50
8. Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore 2005. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism, Oxford: Blackwell
9. Chalmers, D. manuscript a. Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account (forthcoming in Noûs)
10. Chalmers, D. manuscript b. The Multiplicity of Meaning
11. Cohen, S. 1987. Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards, Synthese 73: 3-26
12. DeRose, K. 1995. Solving the Skeptical Problem, Philosophical Review 104: 1 -52
13. DeRose, K. 2004. Single Scoreboard Semantics, Philosophical Studies 119: 1 -21
14. DeRose, K. 2006. 'Bamboozled by Our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 316-38
15. Egan, A. 2007. Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion, Philosophical Studies 133: 1 -22
16. Egan, A., J. Hawthorne, and B. Weatherson 2004. Epistemic Modals in Context, in Contextualism in Philosophy, ed. G. Preyer and G. Peter, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 131-68
17. Fara, D. G. 2003. Desires, Scope and Tense, Philosophical Perspectives 17: Philosophy of Language and Philosophical Linguistics, 141-63. (Originally published under the name 'Delia Graff'.)
18. Glanzberg, M. forthcoming. Semantics and Truth Relative to a World, in Relative Truth, ed. B. Brogaard, Synthese, DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9285-3
19. Halliday, D. 2007. Contextualism, Comparatives and Gradability, Philosophical Studies 132: 381 -93
20. Hawthorne, J. 2003. Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Clarendon Press
21. Higginbotham, J. 2002. Why is Sequence of Tense Obligatory?, in Logical Form and Language, ed. G. Preyer and G. Peter, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 207 -27
22. Hofweber, T. 2005. A Puzzle about Ontology, Noûs 39: 256-83
23. Kamp, H. 1971. Formal Properties of 'Now', Theoria 37: 227-73
24. Kaplan, D. 1989. Demonstratives, in Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, H. Wettstein, and J. Perry, New York: Oxford University Press: 233-49
25. King, J. C. 2003. Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values, Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics, ed. J. Hawthorne and D. Zimmerman: 195-246
26. Kölbel, M. 2002. Truth Without Objectivity, London: Routledge
27. Kölbel, M. 2003. Faultless Disagreement, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 53-73
28. Kölbel, M. forthcoming. The Evidence for Relativism, in Relative Truth, ed. B. Brogaard, Synthese, 10.1007/ s11229-007-9281-7
29. Lasersohn, P. 2005. Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste, Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643 -86
30. Lasersohn, P. forthcoming. Relative Truth, Speaker Commitment, and Control of Implicit Arguments, in Relative Truth, ed. B. Brogaard, Synthese, DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9280-8
31. Lewis, D. 1996. Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549-67
32. Ludlow, P. 2005. Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology, in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth, ed. G. Peter and G. Preyer, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 11 - 50
33. MacFarlane, J. 2005a. The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1, ed. T. Szabo-Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 197-233
34. MacFarlane, J. 2005b. Making Sense of Relative Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 321 -39
35. MacFarlane, J. 2007. Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism, in Content and Context: Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, ed. G. Preyer and G. Peter: 240 -50
36. MacFarlane, J. forthcoming. Nonindexical Contextualism, in Relative Truth, ed. B. Brogaard, Synthese, DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2
37. MacFarlane, J. manuscript. Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths
38. Recanati, F. 1987. Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 57-73
39. Recanati, F. 2004. Indexicality and Context-shift, Conference Paper, Workshop on Indexicals, Speech Acts, and Logophors, Harvard University: 11-20
40. Richard, M. 2004. Contextualism and Relativism, Philosophical Studies 199: 215 -42
41. Rysiew, P. 2001. The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, Noûs 35: 477-514
42. Schiffer, S. 1987. Remnants of Meaning, Cambridge MA: MIT Press
43. Schiffer, S. 1996. Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 317-33
44. Stanley, J. 1997a. Names and Rigid Designation, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. B. Hale and C. Wright, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 555 -85
45. Stanley, J. 1997b. Rigidity and Content, in Language, Thought and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, ed. R. Heck, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 131-56
46. Stanley, J. 2002. Nominal Restriction, in Logical Form and Language, ed. G. Preyer and G. Peter, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 365 -88
47. Stanley, J. 2004. On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism, Philosophical Studies 119: 119 -46
48. Stanley, J. manuscript. Against Knowledge Relativism, http://pwp.netcabo.pt/0154943702/Handout2.pdf, reprinted with revisions as chapter 7 of Stanley 2005
49. Stanley, J. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests, Oxford: Oxford University Press
50. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Clarendon Press
51. Weatherson, B. forthcoming. Conditionals and Indexical Relativism, in Relative Truth, ed. B. Brogaard, Synthese: DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9283-5