Random-player games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 353-388

  Milchtaich, Igal ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Auctions; Correlated equilibrium; Incomplete information; Point processes

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942477641     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.002     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Aumann, R.J., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica 55, 1-18.
2. Billingsley, P., 1999. Convergence of Probability Measures, 2nd Edition. Wiley, New York.
3. Brandenburger, A., Dekel, E., 1993. Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge. J. Econ. Theory 59, 189-198.
4. Cotter, K.D., 1991. Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies. J. Econ. Theory 54, 48-68.
5. Cotter, K.D., 1994. Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty. Econ. Theory 4, 617-627.
6. Daley, D.J., Vere-Jones, D., 1988. An Introduction to the Theory of Point Processes. Springer-Verlag, New York.
7. Dunford, N., Schwartz, J.T., 1958. Linear Operators. Part I. Interscience, New York.
8. Dvoretzky, A., Wald, A., Wolfowitz, J., 1951. Relations among certain ranges of vector measures. Pacific J. Math. 1, 59-74.
9. Fan, K., 1952. Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear spaces. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 38, 121-126.
10. Forges, F., 1993. Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information. Theory Dec. 35, 277-310.
11. Harsanyi, J.C., 1967. Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players. Part I: The basic model. Management Sci. 14, 159-182.
12. Harstad, R.M., Kagel, J.H., Levin, D., 1990. Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders. Econ. Letters 33, 35-40.
13. Kallenberg, O., 1986. Random Measures, 4th Edition. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, Academic Press, London.
14. Mailath, G.J., Samuelson, L., Shaked, A., 1997. Correlated equilibria and local interactions. Econ. Theory 9, 551-556.
15. Matthews, S., 1987. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer's point of view. Econometrica 55, 633-646.
16. McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J., 1987. Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders. J. Econ. Theory 43, 1-19.
17. Mertens, J.-F., Zamir, S., 1985. Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 14, 1-29.
18. Milgrom, P.R., Weber, R.J., 1985. Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information. Math. Oper. Res. 10, 619-632.
19. Myerson, R.B., 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
20. Myerson, R.B., 1998a. Population uncertainty and Poisson games. Int. J. Game Theory 27, 375-392.
21. Myerson, R.B., 1998b. Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem. Games Econ. Behavior 25, 111-131.
22. Myerson, R.B., 2000. Large Poisson games. J. Econ, Theory 94, 7-45.
23. Parthasarathy, K.R., 1967. Probability Measures on Metric Spaces. Academic Press, New York.
24. Resnick, S.I., 1987. Extreme Values, Regular Variation, and Point Processes. Springer-Verlag, New York.
25. Wagner, D.H., 1977. Survey of measurable selection theorems. SIAM J. Control Optim. 15, 859-903.
26. Wagner, D.H., 1980. Survey of measurable selection theorems: an update. In: Közlov, D. (Ed.), Measure Theory, Oberwolfach 1979, Lecture Notes in Math., vol. 794. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 176-219.