Strategic judgment proofing

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 926-948

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a   Spier, Kathryn E ^a,b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149393870     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00044.x     Document Type: Article

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