The benefits of extended liability

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 562-582

  Hiriart, Yolande ^a   Martimort, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248362411     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00031.x     Document Type: Article

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