Bidding strategies for simultaneous ascending auctions

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2008, Pages

  Wellman, Michael P ^a   Osepayshvili, Anna ^a   MacKie Mason, Jeffrey K ^a   Reeves, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Game theory; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149392989     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1461     Document Type: Article

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