Voluntary relationships among mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators: An economic explanation

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 72-84

  Banerjee, Aniruddha ^a   Dippon, Christian M ^b  

^a NERA Economic Consulting ^*  (United States)

^b NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING   (United States)

Author keywords

Brand reputation; Mobile network operator; Mobile virtual network operator; Price elasticities; Profit maximization; Voluntary strategic partnership; Wholesale discount

Indexed keywords

ELASTICITY; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MANGANESE COMPOUNDS; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKS; OPTIMIZATION; SALES; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

BRAND REPUTATION; MOBILE NETWORK OPERATOR; MOBILE VIRTUAL NETWORK OPERATOR; PRICE ELASTICITIES; PROFIT MAXIMIZATION; VOLUNTARY STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP; WHOLESALE DISCOUNT;

WIRELESS NETWORKS;

MOBILE COMMUNICATION; PRICE DYNAMICS; PROFITABILITY; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 58149352268     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2008.10.003     Document Type: Article

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